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Introduction
The debate over which criminal prosecutions, if any, ought to be
lodged in federal rather than state courts is an old one, dating back to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. B.A. University of Virginia, 1978; J.D. Yale Law School, 1982. Professor Little was a
federal prosecutor from 1987 to 1994 and has drawn on that experience for certain points
in this Article. Many thanks are due to colleagues at an early Hastings work-in-progress
workshop, with special thanks to Ash Bhagwat, Evan Lee, Richard Marcus, and William
Wang. Akil Amar, Eric Havian, John Jeffries, Judith Resnik, and Judge William Schwarzer
all read drafts and, while surely not agreeing with all, offered cogent comments. Final
thanks are also due to Hastings students Viviana Waisman for invaluable support and edit-
ing assistance and Richard Chisholm and Lisa Leebove for fine research assistance.
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the inception of the union.' Like all old stories, the debate has be-
come laden with myths; on some pertinent points the facts have be-
come shrouded and exaggerated. Meanwhile, "federalization of
crime ' 2 continues, often in an ad hoc and unprincipled manner; and
many federal judges say they have surpassed reasonable workload
limits. 3 Indeed, despite deep political diversity, federal judges (at
least those who have gone public) seem unanimous in their criticisms
of and responses to federalization: close the federal courthouse doors
and stop federalizing-indeed, defederalize-crime. 4
1. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv. L.
Rev. 545, 548-55 (1925) (describing 1790-1802 "conflict of views" over whether federal
courts ought to have more, less, or concurrent jurisdiction over criminal offenses).
2. "Federalization of crime" is a term of art used (generally with a derogatory scowl)
to describe congressional legislation that provides for federal jurisdiction over criminal
conduct that could also be prosecuted by state or local authorities. This Article will refer
to such criminal conduct as "dual jurisdiction crimes," as opposed to conduct that can be
prosecuted only in a federal, or only in a state, court. See infra text accompanying notes
18-27. Furthermore, this Article will use the term "federalization" to refer to federaliza-
tion of criminal conduct; federalization of civil causes of action, which may be a problem of
far greater proportions (see infra notes 41 and 73) is not addressed here.
Although it is a bit of a mongrel, the word "federalization" appears in at least some
dictionaries. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 532 (1960) ("federalize:
... (2) to put under the authority of a federal government"). The earliest use I have found
of this word in connection with criminal conduct occurs in 1973. Robert L. Stern, The
Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271,
274 (1973). Federalization is now apparently an accepted term of art.
3. See, e.g., Maryanne Trump Barry, Don't Make a Federal Case of It, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1994, at A31 (discussing the possible negative consequences of federalizing
crime). Judge Barry, chair of the federal Judicial Conference's Criminal Law Committee,
was objecting to the then-proposed 1994 federal Crime Bill, which she stated would
"swamp the Federal courts." Judge Barry's views appear to be quite representative of
federal judges. For example, in a 1992 Federal Judiciary Center survey, 73% of all federal
circuit judges and more than 57% of all federal district judges said that the volume of
federal criminal cases was a "large" or "grave" problem. Federal Judicial Ctr., Planning for
the Future: Results of a 1992 Federal Judicial Center Survey of United States Judges 3, 25
(1994) [hereinafter 1992 JUDICIAL SURVEY]. See also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 37 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 FED. COURTS
STUDY] (noting "the current overload within the federal system"); Hon. Stephen Rein-
hardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1993, at 52 ("Most of us are now working to maximum capacity.").
4. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 22 (1994) [herein-
after 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN] (recommending that "Congress should review existing fed-
eral statutes with the goal of eliminating provisions no longer serving an essential federal
purpose"). See infra note 39 (more fully describing the Long Range Plan). These recently
expressed concerns are by no means the first, however. In 1977 revered Judge Friendly of
the Second Circuit noted that "[c]onsiderably more troubling to me ... has been what
seems a knee-jerk tendency of Congress to seek to remedy any serious abuse by invoking
the commerce power as a basis for the expansion of the federal criminal law into areas of
scant federal concern." Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 YALE L.J. 1019,
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Yet at the same time, the federal courts handle only a small per-
centage-less than ten percent-of all criminal prosecutions in this
country. The rest are in state courts.5 Even on a per-judge basis, state
judges handle far more criminal cases than do their federal counter-
parts.6 Thus, as Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of
Appeals recently noted, in light of this imbalance, simply diverting
what are presently federal criminal cases into the state courts is "no
solution at all."'7
1026-27 (1977). In 1934 Edward Rubin noted "the increasing demand for federal control
of crime" in an inaugural-year issue of Law & Contemporary Problems devoted entirely to
"Extending Federal Powers Over Crime." Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal
Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAw & CoNTEmp. PIoBs. 494,494 (1934). Indeed, 70 years ago in
1925, Professor Charles Warren decried "[tihe present congested condition of the dockets
of the Federal Courts and the small prospect of any relief to the heavily burdened Federal
Judiciary, so long as Congress continues, every year, to expand the scope of the body of
Federal crimes." Warren, supra note 1, at 545. This relatively continuous expression of
federalization concerns over this century gives one pause before uncritically accepting the
"crisis" cry today, when there are roughly five times as many federal judges-yet only
slightly more federal criminal cases-as in Warren's day. See infra text accompanying
notes 50-58.
5. In 1992, for example, 47,467 criminal cases were filed in the federal district courts.
WILLIAM W SCHWARZER & RussELL R. WHEELER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31 n.84
(1994) [hereinafter ON FEDERALIZATION]. Yet in 1991, more than 12.4 million criminal
cases were filed in state trial courts. BRIAN J. OSTEUM ET AL., NATIONAL CrR. FOR STATE
COtms, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTcs: ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 3 (1993). In-
deed, state courts reported almost 900,000 felony convictions for 1992. N.Y. Tmms, Jan.
26, 1995, at A6. Thus, even if all 1992 federal criminal filings were felonies (but many were
misdemeanors) and all were convictions (they assuredly were not), federal criminal cases
still represented less than 6% of the total. Accord Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too
Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in this
Symposium Issue. ("[Tihe states are still handling more than 95% of all violent crime
prosecutions.") This disparity is uncontroversial and encompasses civil cases as well as
criminal. As the Federal Courts Study Committee noted in 1990, "90 percent of the na-
tion's judicial business [civil and criminal] is handled by state rather than federal courts."
1990 FED. COURTS STuDY, supra note 3, at 4. Accord Judith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone
Wild, N.Y. Tmms, Dec. 13, 1994, at A19 ("The [Long Range] Report laments the 282,000
cases filed in Federal district courts last year. But in that period more than 200,000 cases
were filed in the New York City Family Court alone.")
6. See infra text accompanying notes 59-63. Accord Beale, supra note 5; see also ON
FEDERALIZATION, supra note 5, at 23 n.60 ("[O]n average, a state court judge carries a
caseload three times as large as that of a federal district judge... [and] the state general
jurisdiction judiciary handles more than fifty-two times as many civil and criminal cases,
with only fifteen times as many judges, as the federal judiciary.")
7. Kaye, supra note 5. Accord Former California Supreme Court Justice Joseph R.
Grodin, Testimony Before the Long Range Planning Committee of the United States Judi-
cial Conference 1 (Dec. 1994) ("State court systems are ... typically burdened in similar
fashion.").
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The federalization conundrum is thereby set. Crime shows no
sign of significantly diminishing.8 Resources are limited and strained.
How are we to decide which criminal cases go where, when no one
wants them?
This Article will not solve that foundational puzzle. Rather, the
Article seeks to sketch and probe the controversy historically, statisti-
cally, and theoretically. The attitude is one of skepticism, "the
method of suspended judgment," 9 rather than an unquestioning ac-
ceptance of the idea that we are in the midst of a federal courts "cri-
sis."'u Surprisingly some of the commonly expressed presuppositions
of the federalization debate, stylized here as "myths," are less than
firm.
By exposing some of the myths and asking some difficult ques-
tions, this Article does not thereby endorse unprincipled or ad hoc
federalization of crime. To the contrary, this Article concludes that
valid considerations support a presumption against criminal federali-
zation.1' However, this Article also argues that such a presumption
must be rebuttable and proposes that such rebuttal be founded on a
principle of "demonstrated state failure" to address a category of
crime. This federalization principle should be available (contrary to
the current critiques) even if such a failure occurs in the area of nar-
cotics, firearms, or other "street crimes" that may not have a firm his-
torical precedent of federal prosecution.' 2
The federal courts legitimately have been called upon to address
seemingly local offenses at times of epidemic crime and "state fail-
ures" of prosecution. The Prohibition and civil rights eras of federal
prosecutions immediately come to mind. Today's legislatures, federal
8. A 1994 FBI Report on Crime states that, while some types of violent crime were
down for 1994, there was an overall "increase in all types of crime nationwide." Former
FBI Expert Discusses Crime Report (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 4, 1994), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library. Moreover, at least some law enforcement experts assert that "the
numbers will get worse in the next five years." Id.
9. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 2353 (2d ed. 1954).
10. Cf. 1990 FED. COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 6 ("[Tlhe long-expected crisis of
the federal courts ... is at last upon us.").
11. Such a presumption is in accord with the views expressed by Judge Schwarzer and
Russell Wheeler at the end of their comprehensive On Federalization pamphlet, supra note
5, at 47. The route taken by this Article, however, is somewhat different.
12. Professor Judith Resnik has made a similar point about certain civil contexts. See
Judith Resnik, Statement Before the Long Range Planning Committee of the United
States Judicial Conference 5 (Dec. 1994) ("'State' and 'federal' interests are not pre-ex-
isting defined sets of activities but are interactive and interdependent conceptions that vary
over time.... What today appears to be only of local concern may tomorrow be on the
national agenda.").
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as well as state, apparently believe that narcotics and weapons of-
fenses have reached similar levels of epidemic state failure propor-
tions and thus demand federal attention. It may be legitimate to
suggest the wrong-headedness of the policies underlying such de-
mands and to call for reform of the criminal law.13 But simply to close
the federal courthouse doors to certain crimes as a jurisdictional mat-
ter in the name of a federalization "crisis" that is far from empirically
clear is, this Article submits, not principled.14
What distinguishes valid dual jurisdiction federal crimes from the
illegitimate is seldom addressed in criticisms of federalization.' 5 In-
deed, that fact provides the happy occasion for a Symposium devoted
to federalization principles. However, despite the absence of prelimi-
nary definition, large aspects of the federalization critique are valid.
Recent decisions to "federalize" certain crimes have surely been ad
hoc and unprincipled; making intrastate auto theft a federal carjacking
crime in 1993 provides a fine example.' 6
13. See, eg., Vaughn Walker, Comment: Federalizing Organized Crime, in this Sym-
posium Issue; STEVEN B. DUmE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RE-
THINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGANsT DRUGS (1993) (calling for decriminalization of
currently illegal drugs).
14. The author is well aware of the controversial nature of many of these assertions
and would be the first to agree that more empirical work and study needs to be done. Yet
some comfort perhaps may be drawn from recent remarks made by U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Breyer, who is reported to have argued in a recent speech against simply
"closing the doors to the [federal] courts." He stated that the "[fiederal judges' desire to
reduce their crowded dockets doesn't justify shifting the cases into the state courts...
because those courts are just as crowded." Breyer Urges Judges to Remain Generalists,
MARrN INDEP. J., Jan. 28, 1995, at A7.
15. Judge William Schwarzer, who has been Director of the Federal Judicial Center
for the past five years, and FJC staff member Russell Wheeler comprehensively survey the
arguments for and against federalization in their pamphlet On Federalization, supra note 5.
They nevertheless conclude that such definition may well remain "elusive" and advert to
the impossibility of precisely determining "what constitutes an 'important federal inter-
est."' Id. at 42, 45.
16. Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (1992)). The legislative history of the carjacking bill indicates that it was
introduced after a widely reported violent carjacking committed against a mother and her
young child in the Washington D.C. area. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The
Federalization of American Criminal Law, in this Symposium Issue. As President Bush
noted upon signing the carjacking law, it was responsive to a "recent wave of these carjack-
ings." President's Statement (Oct. 25, 1995), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.)
2903. Yet no generalized "principle" for federalizing purely intrastate car thefts, already
prosecutable in every state in the Union, was advanced. Indeed, apparently to address
concerns that the bill would unnecessarily federalize every simple car theft, a requirement
that a firearm must be possessed was included. See 106 Stat. at 3384. No principled dis-
tinction exists, however, between gun carjackings and knife carjackings, and Congress
eliminated the firearm requirement in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1970 (1994).
While national statistics are not yet available on use of this new statute, it seems safe to say
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But other parts of the current federalization critique are possibly
more myth than reality. This Article addresses three such myths:
1. that federalization of crime is a new phenomenon;
2. that there presently exists an unprecedented federal court work-
load "crisis" in criminal cases, such that federal judges are so busy
trying criminal cases that civil cases cannot be tried;17
3. that federalization of crime is forever, permanently rending the
federal-state balance.
Placing the current federalization debate into the broader historical
context of over 200 years of federal criminal legislation helps to de-
bunk these myths.
Finally, this Article addresses the concept of a "principled juris-
prudence of federalization" and inquires whether, and what, neutral
principles can be stated to guide future decisions to enact and prose-
cute dual jurisdiction federal crimes. Suggesting that existing formula-
tions are inadequate, this Article sketches a principle of "demon-
strated state failure," which explains past accepted federalizations and
could be used to evaluate future federalization efforts.
I. The Federalization Debate
The federalization debate centers on criminal conduct that can be
prosecuted in state courts as well as in federal courts. Some criminal
conduct is only prosecutable in federal courts; federal jurisdiction over
such crimes is exclusive. Such exclusively federal crimes include
crimes committed on federal territory or outside the borders of the
fifty states18 and criminal acts committed solely against a unique fed-
eral interest, such as treason. 19 Providing jurisdiction in the federal
that relatively few carjackings have actually been charged federally, despite their undoubt-
edly frequent occurrence.
17. See, e.g., 1990 FED. COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 6 (stating, without citation or
specific example, that "the expanded federal effort to reduce drug trafficking has led to a
recent surge in federal criminal trials that is preventing federal judges in major metropoli-
tan areas from scheduling civil trials"); Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Fed-
eral Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 681, 686 (1992) [hereinafter Miner, Crime and
Punishment] (stating, without citation, that "[i]n many districts throughout the country,
judges are unable to get to their civil calendars because of the huge numbers of criminal
cases that they may dispose of').
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1969 & Supp. 1995) (granting federal jurisdiction over such
crimes by assimilating neighboring states' criminal codes); 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1985) (grant-
ing federal jurisdiction over "offenses not committed in any district"). Note that the crimes
prosecutable under the Assimilative Crimes Act are all the "local" crimes of the neighbor-
ing state; thus, under this provision, federal courts try "local" offenses.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970 & Supp. 1995).
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courts for the prosecution of such uniquely federal crimes seems
noncontroversial.
But truly unique federal crimes compose a quite narrow band of
cases. They pose no controversy precisely because they are so rare, as
well as because there is no alternative forum. However, there are
other federal crimes that are often described as "unquestionably" fed-
era120 but which, in fact, encompass conduct that is also prosecutable
by the states. Once this point is understood, it becomes clear that the
huge majority of federal crimes21 have always been "dual jurisdiction"
crimes rather than exclusively federal.22
Murder of the President, for example, is obviously prosecutable
in state court as murder2 3 Many federal civil rights offenses are al-
ready prosecutable in state court, if not as civil rights offenses, then as
20. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20.
21. It would be convenient to use a phrase here like "the bulk of the federal criminal
code," but this temptation must be avoided because it is inaccurate. There is no single title
in the United States Code that contains all federal criminal provisions. See Louis B.
Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics and Prospects, 1977 DuKE
L.J. 171,184 ("[The United States ... has never ... had a comprehensive, logically organ-
ized and internally consistent penal code."). The efforts of Professor Schwartz and others
to reform and organize federal criminal provisions failed in the 1970s. It is perhaps signifi-
cant that a major objection to the proposed reform bills was about federalization (although
that word was not used): that "matters heretofore considered exclusively local" would
expressly have been encompassed by new federal criminal jurisdiction provisions. John G.
Miles, Federal Criminal Code Reform: The Jurisdictional Issue, 23 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 11 (Supp.), at 4 (June 14, 1978) (quoting the National Association of Attorneys
General).
Thus, federal crimes can today be found in virtually every title of the U.S. Code; major
locations include Title 18 (general crimes), Title 21 (controlled substances), and Title 26
(tax provisions). There is consequently no easy way to locate all federal criminal provi-
sions; many are quite obscure. For example, in order to federally prosecute a union pay-
roll-padding scheme in which there were no federal mailings or interstate travel or
transmissions, the author once had to prosecute under 42 U.S.C. § 408(g)(2) (now codified
at § 408(a)(7)(B) (1991 & Supp. 1994)), the well-known offense of "false representation of
a social security number." See United States v. Holland, 880 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir.
1989).
22. Such a classification error appears, for example, in Second Circuit Judge Roger
Miner's 1987 article, in which he describes "offenses directly affecting the operations of
government" as one of four categories of "exclusive" federal criminal jurisdiction. Roger
J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. Po'y 117,
119 (1987) [hereinafter Miner, Federal Courts]. While one might argue that criminal con-
duct that directly affects the federal government should be federalized, such conduct is
almost never "exclusively" within federal jurisdiction. Judge Miner is due credit as one of
the few federal judges to publicly detail his views about federalization. But careful classifi-
cation of criminal conduct is essential to the federalization debate, lest one presume one's
conclusions in the initial definition of jurisdictional lines.
23. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1984 & Supp. 1995) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 187 (Deering 1988).
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assaults, batteries, and the like.24 Counterfeiting could be prosecuted
as state common law fraud.25 Robbery of a federally insured bank,
theft of federal property or by federal employees, defrauding a federal
program, bribery of federal officials, even federal tax offenses26 -vir-
tually all could be charged under existing state robbery, theft, fraud,
bribery or falsehood statutes. Indeed, with many states now enacting
"little RICO" statutes, the need for the equivalent federal provision is
not self-evident.27
Yet most of these dual jurisdiction federal crimes are not the
topic of current federalization critiques. To the contrary, most are ac-
cepted as "unquestionably associated with a national government,"
and the federal Judicial Conference states that "no one seriously dis-
putes" their federalization.28 But the rationale for labeling these
crimes as unquestionably federal is not explained. A shift of such
crimes to state courts would significantly lighten the federal load,
more so than would the elimination of federal drug cases.29
24. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245 (1969 & Supp. 1995) with CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 240-45 (assaults), 422.6 (interference with exercise of civil rights) (Deering 1988
& Supp. 1995).
25. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 471-509 (1976 & Supp. 1995) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 470-484, 648 (1988 & Supp. 1995). Although the Constitution grants Congress the
power to punish counterfeiting, it does not require that such jurisdiction be exclusive. See
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113, 1001-1027, 1701, 201 (1984 & Supp. 1995); 26 U.S.C. § 7201
(1989).
27. The federal Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO) is
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (1984 & Supp. 1995). For a list of equivalent state pro-
visions, see Ethan B. Gerber, "A RICO You Can't Refuse". New York's Organized Crime
Control Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 982 & n.14 (1988) ("[A]t least twenty states have
passed statutes which are modeled after federal RICO."). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
this theoretical overlap in 1989 remarks revealingly entitled Get RICO Cases Out of My
Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at A14 (addressing civil RICO cases, while noting
that "[o]verlapping criminal remedies do not present much of a problem, because state and
federal prosecutors tend to work things out on a sensible basis"). Of course, there may be
significant procedural advantages to prosecuting RICO offenses in federal courts. See gen-
erally John C. Jeffries, Jr., & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Ad-
vantages of Federal Prosecution, in this Symposium Issue. This does not, however,
undermine the more general point that even such complex federal crimes are actually
"dual jurisdiction" and not uniquely federal.
28. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20, 21.
29. For example, in 1982, fraud, counterfeiting, forgery, and auto theft defendants
made up 22% of the federal criminal caseload. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: THE NATURE OF CHANGE 6 fig. 5 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD]. "Drug" defendants constituted only 21%. Id. Similarly,
in 1993 federal drug prosecutions represented only a quarter of the federal criminal
caseload. Chief Justice's 1993 Year-End Report Highlights Cost Saving Measures, THE
THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1994, at 4.
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Nevertheless, the current federalization 'critique focuses almost
entirely on federal narcotics and firearms offenses, but generally with-
out noting why. Chief Justice Rehnquist has claimed that federal
courts are in danger of becoming "national narcotics courts," a specter
that has been repeatedly echoed by other federal judges.30 When fed-
eral judges say that "[t]oo much crime is prosecuted in the federal
courts," they concentrate on "drug offense[s]," not penny-ante bank
robberies or postal thefts.31 The charge is often accompanied by the
view that federal judges are being forced to "waste" valuable re-
sources on federal criminal cases that are really "state or local
crimes."'32 But since the great bulk of federal criminal cases involve
other types of dual jurisdiction conduct, it seems fair to question why
drug and weapon cases draw the bulk of federal judges' ire.
The current critique of the federalization of crime can be de-
scribed as encompassing four general types of concerns: (1) workload,
(2) open forum, (3) dignity, and (4) federalism concerns. Critics argue
that federalization is bad because federal judges are overworked,33
criminal cases are blocking the federal forum for important federal
civil cases,34 federal judges ought not have to handle "ordinary street
crimes," 35 and because federalization of dual jurisdiction crimes im-
properly encroaches on matters that should remain state concerns.3 6
As detailed below, the first two concerns are not borne out by
existing statistical evidence; additional empirical work should be done.
The third concern is unanalyzed and unprincipled. Finally, while fed-
eralism concerns seem valid at some general level, they pull in oppo-
30. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion Symposium (June 18, 1993) (transcript available on Reuters). When leaving the bench
in December 1993, Judge Kenneth Conboy repeated the concern. Kenneth Conboy,
Trouble in Foley Square, N.Y. Tins, Dec. 27, 1993, at A17.
31. E.g., Miner, Crime and Punishment, supra note 17, at 681, 683. Judge Miner also
pokes fun at obscure federal offenses such as reproducing the image of Smokey the Bear or
impersonating a 4-H club member. Id. at 681. But these crimes are not the serious object
of Judge Miner's concern; they are, as he notes, "statutory anachronisms." Id. In fact, they
are simply never prosecuted and thus are no burden on anyone but the printers of Title 18.
32. See, e.g., Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary,
reprinted in Tim TimRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Vols. 23-26,
1991-1994; ON FEDERLAUZATION, supra note 5, at 37 ("inefficient and wasteful"); 1992 Ju-
DICIAL SuRvy, supra note 3, at 7, 29 (FJC asks whether, and the overwhelming majority
of federal judges agree that, "federal criminal jurisdiction" should be "more narrowly de-
fined to reduce prosecution of 'ordinary' street crime in federal courts").
33. See infra notes 38-40.
34. See infra notes 82-84.
35. See infra notes 122-124.
36. See infra notes 152-156.
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site directions when considered in light of our horribly overburdened
state criminal justice systems. A constitutional theory of limited fed-
eral authority may well support a presumption against federalizing
dual jurisdiction criminal conduct. Yet that presumption must be re-
buttable; and even a limited federalist theory may require a federal
response to criminal conduct that has reached epidemic proportions.
37
A. Workload Concerns
The most frequently heard complaint from federal judges is that
they are overworked.3 8 In the most recent judicial expression of fed-
eralization concerns, the Long Range Planning Committee of the
United States Judicial Conference states that "[h]uge burdens are now
being placed on the federal courts."'3 9 This Committee speaks in
terms of "crisis" caused by burgeoning workload and predicts that
37. On this last point, for example, even Judge Miner's ardent anti-federalization
piece states that "the national government ... should have in reserve the power to deal
with crime where there has been a complete breakdown of local and state law enforce-
ment." Miner, Crime and Punishment, supra note 17, at 687-88. See also 1994 LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21-22 (endorsing federal prosecution of local crimes that
"[raise] highly sensitive issues in the local community" and citing civil rights prosecutions
as exemplary because "local law enforcement had moved reluctantly").
38. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Caseloads and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to
Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 3, 3 (statistical survey of the views of federal judges, sum-
marized as "[f]ederal judges, by their accounts, have too much to do"); 1992 JUDICIAL
SURVEY, supra note 3, at 25 (more than 80% of federal district judges describe their work-
load as "a problem"; more than 90% say this is so with regard to criminal cases).
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, this may be contrasted to the 1950s, when some
federal district judges allegedly took their summers off, and some federal appellate judges
allegedly viewed their appointments as "semi-retirement." Hon. William H. Rehnquist,
Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1, 2.
39. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 7. The Committee on Long Range
Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States is an important and unprece-
dented effort to anticipate and guide the future of the federal courts in the face of an
incredibly "accelerated pace of social change." Id. at 1. It was created in 1990 at the
urging of the Ninth Circuit's Chief Judge Clifford Wallace among others and hopes to set a
"judiciary wide" agenda for years to come. Id at 131. The Committee has a prestigious
membership; it is chaired by Judge Otto R. Skopil, Jr., of the Ninth Circuit and has eight
other federal judges as members, as well as a full time staff and a number of consultants
and contributors. Id at 131, 139-44.
When presented at the Hastings Symposium, this Article cited to the November 1994
draft of the Proposed Long Range Plan. Since then, a revised draft was received. JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (2d prtg.
Mar. 1995). The March 1995 Plan did not significantly alter the substance of the Novem-
ber draft's provisions related to this Article. (Indeed, having received a draft of this Arti-
cle in the interim, the March 1995 Plan added certain themes responsive to this Article.
See infra text accompanying notes 152-184 and 198-201 (federalism concerns and sunset
provisions)). Thus, citations in this Article remain to the November 1994 Plan.
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"core values" of the federal judicial system cannot be preserved with-
out attention to the problem.40
Federal workload complaints often focus on criminal cases, which
is surprising because civil cases compose the majority of the average
federal judge's caseload.41 Nevertheless, a major concern of the Long
Range Planning Committee is that "Congress continues to 'federalize'
crimes previously prosecuted in the state courts."42 Thus, a primary
premise of the Long Range Planning Committee's recommendations
is "limited jurisdiction" over crime for federal courts as a "practical
necessity. '43 Indeed, one indication of the federal judiciary's preemi-
nent concern about the federal criminal docket is that the Long Range
Planning Committee's initial discussion of "judicial federalism" and its
first four specific recommendations address criminal cases." Only af-
ter these concerns are expressed is specific attention given by the
Committee to the numerically far larger civil side.
But the criminal workload concerns of federal courts are open to
question. Federal criminal filings are in fact declining; they have been
40. Id. at 9-11, 16 (describing a "nightmarish" future scenario); accord 1990 FED.
CouRTs STUDY, supra note 3, at 4 ("the crisis"). Expression of workload concerns can be
absolute (that is, "we are simply working too hard"), but may also move to a relative
concern, that criminal cases are pushing aside important civil litigation (that is, "we are not
working impossibly hard, but criminal cases prevent us from working hard enough on im-
portant civil cases"). Such "open forum" concerns are analytically distinct from pure
workload and therefore are addressed separately infra notes 81-121.
41. For example, in 1994, there were 235,996 civil cases commenced in federal district
courts, compared to 45,744 criminal cases. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 11
tbl. 3. This is roughly an 84% to 16%, or 5 to 1, ratio. See also WLiAm P. McLAUGHLAN,
FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 114 (1984) ("[T]he civil portion of the district courts' docket
clearly predominates today and has done so for several decades."); Id. at 113 fig. 5.1
(graphically demonstrating basically flat criminal filings over 40 years, while civil filings
steeply incline). McLaughlan's statistical survey of federal court case filings over some
forty years is one of the most comprehensive such surveys ever done. Yet, because civil
cases predominate hugely over criminal in the federal courts, McLaughlan's book concen-
trates far more on the details of civil case filings.
42. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20. Thus, the objection apparently is to
enacting new federal crimes. This too is slightly surprising, as it can be argued that rather
than the absolute number of federal crimes, it is the "federalization" of criminal procedure
that has occurred since 1960 (via the "constitutionalization" of criminal procedure in the
Warren Court and subsequent congressional legislation such as the 1970 Speedy Trial Act,
more detailed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the 1987 federal Sentencing
Guidelines) that has required increased judicial resources necessarily devoted to criminal
cases. While surely significant, these developments are analytically separate from the
number of federal criminal statutes enacted and could be addressed by procedural changes
rather than complete jurisdictional bars to new federal crimes.
43. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 19, 20.
44. Id. at 20-23.
April 1995] MYTHS AND PRINCIPLES
much higher in years past when analyzed on a per-judge basis; and
they are simply dwarfed by the criminal case workload of state judges.
Federal criminal case filings have fluctuated over time, but have
remained basically steady for sixty years. Thus, comparisons between
any two isolated years, without an appreciation of the overall array of
filing statistics,45 can yield wildly varying conclusions. For example,
the 1990 Federal Courts Study noted that criminal filings had in-
creased dramatically from 1980 to 1990; from this a conclusion of
workload "crisis" was suggested.46 Yet if one chooses 1972 as the
baseline comparison year, the number of federal criminal filings is
lower now as compared to then.47 1980 actually represented the low
point of a consistently decreasing criminal case filing trend.48 More-
over, even if a federal criminal case crisis was imminent in 1992, it
apparently has been averted; federal criminal filings have in fact de-
creased by at least three percent in each of the past two years.49
Indeed, the number of federal criminal cases filed today is far
below equivalent filings of sixty years ago, yet today there are seven
times as many federal judges. In 1994 there were 45,500 federal crimi-
nal cases filed;50 in 1932 there were over 86,000.51 At the same time,
the number of federal district judges has increased dramatically, from
401 to 649 since 1970 and from only 163 in 1932.52 One measure of
workload should be how many criminal cases each individual federal
45. See McLAUGHLAN, supra note 41, at 114 ("[T]he criminal portion [of the federal
caseload] shows a striking uniformity over the years [1940-1980].")
46. 1990 FED. COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 36 (noting a 50% increase since 1980).
47. Chief Justice Rehnquist reports that 45,500 federal criminal cases were filed in
1994. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, re-
printed in Ti THIRD BRANCH (Admininstrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1995, at 4.
In 1972 the figure was 47,043. ON FEDERALIZATION, supra note 5, at 31 n.84. The Long
Range Planning Committee notes the lower filing figure, but asserts that the "complexity"
of federal criminal cases has "changed dramatically" since then. Id.; 1994 LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 4, at 8; but see infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
48. ON FEDERALIZATION, supra note 5, at 51 fig. 1.
49. Rehnquist, supra note 47, at 4 (noting 3% decreases in 1993 and 1994). Also
indicative of a long-term trend of relatively decreasing federal criminal caseload, the Long
Range Planning Committee notes that while the U.S. population has grown more than
200% since 1904, the number of federal criminal cases filed has increased by only 157%.
1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 7.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Rubin, supra note 4, at 497 tbl. 1. The actual number of criminal filings was over
92,000, but the 5,700 cases filed in the District of Columbia in 1932 should be deducted
because today such D.C. cases are filed almost exclusively in the local D.C. courts and are
consequently not included in that district's reported U.S. District Court filings.
52. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 13 tbl. 6; 60 F.2d v-ix (1932) (listing
federal district judges).
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judge must handle on average. By this measure, the per-judge work-
load of federal criminal cases was roughly 534 cases per judge in 1932,
115 in 1972, and only 73 in 1994. This is roughly a sevenfold workload
decrease over the past sixty years.53
It is difficult to rationalize away entirely this marked decrease in
the federal criminal caseload-per-judge. Although the 1932 statistics
included a large number of Prohibition cases, that does not mean that
federal judges at that time could ignore those cases 5 4 And while it is
true that criminal cases (both state and federal) are more procedurally
complex today than in the 1930s,55 one may legitimately question
whether that increase in complexity overcomes the sevenfold decrease
in the per-judge criminal caseload since 1932.56 Finally, when one
adds to the mix the additional 300-plus federal magistrates who have
been authorized since 1976 to perform significant work in criminal
cases, 57 the claim of federal judicial overload caused by criminal cases
53. Accord McLAuGHLAN, supra note 41, at 125 ("The medians for criminal filings
per judge have actually dropped rather sharply.").
54. Indeed, the federal criminal caseload increase in the 1920s and 1930s because of
Prohibition cases can be analogized to the current influx of gun, drug, and immigration
cases today, in that controversial areas of substantive criminalization have generated an
unusual number of federal criminal cases in a single category. See Beale, supra note 5
(noting statistical jump in narcotics and firearms cases between 1980 and 1992); see also
Walker, supra note 13 (arguing that narcotics offenses should be decriminalized). Simi-
larly, the 1972 federal criminal case filings included a large number of controversial selec-
tive service cases. The possibility that narcotics cases might go away in the future does not
reduce the impact of those cases on the judiciary today; but the same was true of Prohibi-
tion cases in 1932 and Selective Service cases in 1972.
55. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 8 ("Although difficult to quantify, [fed-
eral criminal] filings have also increased in complexity."). The plan goes on to assert that
the "complexity" of federal criminal cases has changed "dramatically" since 1972. Id. But
precisely because such an assertion is "difficult to quantify," this latter claim is difficult to
evaluate.
56. In addition, the increase in complexity of criminal cases (state as well as federal) is
attributable almost entirely to the "federalization" of criminal procedure, a phenomenon
that was largely accomplished by 1972. See generally THE WARRmN COURT IN HISToRIcAL
AND POLITICAL PERSPECrlVE (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993). Yet since 1972, there has been a
63% decrease in per-judge criminal caseload (roughly 115 per judge in 1972, versus 73 per
judge in 1992). Whether there has been an increase in criminal case complexity since 1972
sufficient to offset this workload decrease is at least a debatable question.
57. Professor Judith Resnik deserves credit for calling attention to the significant roles
played in today's federal courts by non-Article I judges such as magistrate judges. See
Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts,
24 GA. L. REv. 909, 910-12 (1990) (noting that magistrates conducted "134,000 preliminary
hearings in felony cases" in 1987). See also United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 93 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984) (stating that Federal Magistrates Act of 1968
was "intended to give magistrates a significant role in the federal judicial system" and to
"reduce increasingly unmanageable caseloads"). Although more federal criminal cases
were filed in 1972 than today, federal magistrates did not have authority to conduct eviden-
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appears even more debatable.5 8
Not only is the average federal judge's criminal caseload down
over the past sixty years, but the federal criminal caseload-per-judge is
far lower than the same figure for state judges. Judge Schwarzer has
noted this imbalance: he reports that in 1991 "criminal filings in the
state courts were eighty-four times higher than those in federal district
courts."'59 Again, the argument that federal judges simply cannot han-
dle more criminal cases60 is at least open to question in light of what
state court judges are being asked to accomplish.
Comparing one federal geographic district's federal versus state
court criminal filings shows this imbalance dramatically. In 1992 the
number of federal criminal filings in the district court for the Northern
District of California averaged 34 cases per trial judge, while criminal
filings in the superior courts for the counties that compose the North-
ern District's territory averaged at least 157 per judge.61 The North-
tiary hearings such as motions to suppress until 1976. See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d
404, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
58. Also, civil filings in the federal courts far outnumber criminal cases, and by any
measure, more than 50% of federal court time is spent on civil matters. Thus, it seems fair
to inquire (as this Article does supra notes 122-151) whether there is something more than
pure workload concerns to some critics' preoccupation with criminal cases.
59. ON FEDERALIZATION, supra note 5, at 23 n.60. Accord Beale, supra note 5 (na-
tionally, 75 criminal cases per federal judge versus 417 for state judges-over a 5-1 ratio-
in 1992). See also supra note 41.
60. For example, in 1989, Professor Beale, as an Associate Reporter to the Federal
Courts Study Committee, wrote that "the federal courts will soon be overwhelmed" by
criminal cases. Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Caseload/Scope of Federal Criminal Juris-
diction, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIT-
TEE, PART III (1990) [hereinafter Beale, Federal Criminal Caseload]. Also predicted was
that "in the very near future [some] districts will be unable to try any civil cases." Id. at 5.
Albeit this prediction was based solely on anecdotal reports. See infra text accompanying
notes 85 and 106. Yet three years later in 1992, civil trials still represented more than 50%
of all federal trials conducted, THE CRIMIAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 12, and the
author knows of no federal district that is not hearing civil cases today. The gap between
dire prediction and reality must be acknowledged and examined.
61. Certain vagaries in the available data make precise calculations difficult; nor are
state and federal statistics kept in precisely parallel formats. Thus, when I have had uncer-
tainty in making these calculations, I have attempted to err in favor of overstating the
federal workload. The 1993 Annual Report of the California Judicial Council reports that
for fiscal year 1991-1992 in the 15 counties that compose the Northern District of Califor-
nia, there were 32,968 criminal filings in the superior courts; there were another 51,000
felony filings in the municipal courts of those counties. 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFOR-
NIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1993). All the superior court criminal filings should be
felonies, but some portion of them are actually duplicates of cases initially filed in munici-
pal courts. Thus, one cannot simply add up the number of municipal and superior court
criminal filings to get total criminal cases; some number represents duplicated cases. On
the other hand, some portion (probably a large one) of the municipal court felony filings
are finally disposed of there. Thus, using solely the superior court criminal filings surely
[Vol. 46
ern District of California is in the upper third of the 94 federal districts
in terms of filings, trials, and other measures. 62 The other three fed-
eral districts in California (including the Southern District, one of the
highest criminal filing districts in the nation) also had significant state-
federal imbalaifces in criminal case filings in 1992.63
Thus, in terms of absolute number of cases as well as per-judge
criminal filings, it is simply a myth that federal criminal case filings
have skyrocketed. On the other hand, there has been a significant
change in the "character" of the federal criminal caseload: the mix of
cases has shifted dramatically toward larger numbers of narcotics and
weapons offenses.64 Since 1972 the percentage of narcotics and weap-
ons offenses in the federal system has more than doubled: drug of-
fenses have increased from eighteen to forty-one percent of the
federal criminal filings; gun offenses are up from four to eight per-
undercounts the actual number of state felony cases filed in the state courts within the
Northern District of California. But even using just that number, and then dividing by 210
judicial positions available (not necessarily filled) in those counties, yields a per-judge
criminal (felony) caseload in the superior courts of 157. Adding the uncounted yet un-
duplicated municipal court felony cases would obviously increase this number.
Meanwhile, the 1992 Annual Report for the Ninth Circuit shows 682 "criminal filings"
in the federal Northern District of California in 1991. 1992 NInn Cmcurr ANNUAL RE-
PORT 82. This appears to include misdemeanors as well as felonies. Dividing this number
by the number of criminal judicial positions (20 including magistrate judges, who handle all
misdemeanors and perform significant work in felony cases, but excluding senior judges)
yields a per-judge caseload of 34. See JERROLD M. LADAR, NORTHERN DisTmcr OF CALI-
FORNIA STATISTICAL SUMMARY: TRIALS, CIVIL CASEs, CRimINAL CAsES (FoR THE 12-
MONTH PERIOD ENDING JUNE 30,1994)2,8-9 (1994). Adding those senior judges who still
handle criminal cases would obviously decrease this workload figure. See Senior Judges
Help District Courts Keep Pace, THE TmD BRANcH (Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts), May 1994, at 1. Yet, it is still roughly only one-fifth that of the concurrent state
court judges' caseload.
62. See LADAR, supra note 61, at 8-9. In 1992 the Northern District of California
ranked 26 out of 94 federal districts in terms of number of criminal cases filed (558 cases).
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CoURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WoRKLOAD STATIS-
TICs 34-36 tbl. D (1993) [hereinafter 1993 WoRKLOAD STATISTICs]. For purposes of com-
parison (see infra note 63), the Eastern District of California ranked 16 (742 criminal
cases), the Central District ranked 11 (1,116 cases), and the Southern District ranked 9
(1,289 cases). Id. See also LADAR, supra note 61, at 5 (in 1994, the Northern District of
California ranked 33 in trials completed), 7 (ranked in "top ten" for state prisoner cases).
63. Similar calculations, see supra note 62, for the other three districts in California
yield state judge versus federal judge workload figures of 347 cases to 64 in the Eastern
District (Sacramento); 226 to 34 in the Central District (Los Angeles); and 233 to 134 in
the Southern District (San Diego, where there is a large abnormality in the number of
criminal immigration and marijuana cases filed). See 1993 WoRKLOAD STATISTICS, supra
note 62, at 34-36 tbl. D.
64. Ti CRImNAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 4-7.
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cent.65 In addition, increases in the severity of the sentences available
upon conviction for gun and drug offenses have been instituted over
the past decade.66 Many federal judges dislike these higher, often
mandatory, penalties. 67 Anecdotally at least, it is difficult to discuss
workload concerns with a federal judge today and not hear some dis-
tasteful reference to narcotics and firearms cases.68 To be frankly
blunt about the Emperors' situation, some federal judges simply do
65. Id. at 1, 5-6. It is fair to consider narcotics and weapons offenses together because
in reality they are often committed together and charged together. Thus, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c), a frequently charged felon-in-possession offense, provides for severe mandatory
minimum penalties for carrying a firearm during and in relation to any drug trafficking
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
expert testimony that "firearms are often used in drug transactions"); United States v.
Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 1993) ("because guns are used in many drug trans-
actions firearms are relevant and admissible in drug cases"); ROGER HAINES, 1 NImTH
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL LAW REPORT 152 (4th ed. 1990) (separately indexed category for
"Drugs and Firearms").
66. For example, 1986 amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) created new mandatory
minimum sentences of 5, 10, 20 years, or life imprisonment for various federal narcotics
offenses. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002(2) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1986)). Similarly, a
1986 amendment to § 924 increased mandatory imprisonment terms for federal firearms
offenses. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 924 (1986)). The federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines were subsequently drafted to increase the suggested sentencing ranges
for most narcotics offenses. See Irene Nagel, Foreword." Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 931 (1990)
("sentences higher than past practice estimates are also proscribed for those convicted of
violent and drug offenses"); Barbara S. Vincent & Paul J. Hofer, The Consequences of
Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: A Summary of Recent Findings, 7 FED. SENT. REP. 33
(Aug. 1994) (the Guidelines have been set to incorporate the mandatory minimums).
67. Thus, the 1990 Federal Courts Study recommended that Congress "repeal
mandatory sentence provisions," which it noted were "mainly for drug-related crime."
1990 FED. COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 133. Judge Miner states that the new federal
Sentencing Guidelines ranges "seem most often to be on the high side" and particularly
criticized "statutory minimum sentences .... especially in the drug area." Miner, Crime
and Punishment, supra note 17, at 692. In 1993 two senior federal judges announced that
they would no longer handle criminal drug cases because of their disagreement with the
severe penalties mandated by the new Guidelines. Joseph B. Treaster, Two Judges Decline
Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at Al. Judge
Schwarzer was reported at that time to estimate that some fifty federal judges around the
nation were similarly "quietly refusing to handle drug cases." Saundra Torry, Some Federal
Judges Just Say No to Drug Cases, WASH. POST, May 17, 1993, at F7.
68. By definition, this anecdotal assertion is based on the author's own experiences
and conversations. But also, as explained in the text infra, the discussions of the federaliza-
tion issue published by federal judges uniformly focus on the narcotics caseload, without
explaining precisely why. This Article suggests that an unspoken substantive distaste for
certain types of cases motivates these discussions, as well as (or even rather than) simple
workload concerns.
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not like their average and increased numbers of gun and drug cases,
and oppose federalization for this reason.69
Thus, the 1992 Federal Judges Survey expresses distaste for "'or-
dinary' street crimes" being lodged in federal court, without further
defining this concept.70 "Ordinary street crimes" may mean gun and
drug cases. More pointedly perhaps, the Judicial Conference's pro-
posed Long Range Plan (the Plan) states that most gun and drug cases
are "not... enough to involve a federal court's attention," without
explaining why this is necessarily so.7 1 Similarly, the Long Range
Plan singles out the recent increase in narcotics case filings without
explaining why that development is significant, and it separates drug
filing statistics without separating out other types of crimes.72 The
Plan's silence as to why drug cases are singled out leaves a skeptical
reader to wonder whether it reflects substantive distaste for drug cases
or some other unarticulated concern.73
The preoccupation with guns and drugs is apparent, even if unex-
plained. For example, in a 1992 article providing valuable detail re-
garding judicial views on these issues, Judge Miner criticizes recent
federal criminal legislation raising the penalties for felons caught in
possession of weapons as "federalization of state crime."74 He simi-
larly asserts that "[i]f there is one area of criminal prosecution that
69. I am indebted to my Hastings colleague Professor Ash Bhagwat for encouraging
me to make explicit this likely controversial assertion about the substantive undercurrent
of the current federalization debate.
70. 1992 JuDIctAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 7, 29.
71. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21 recommendation (b). The plan
notes that it would make an exception for exceptionally complex drug or weapon conspira-
cies. Id.
72. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 8, 120.
73. In its recent report entitled The Criminal Caseload, the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts notes that the federal criminal caseload, while "fluctuat[ing] wildly since
1950," has not grown much, while civil filings have increased more than 300%. THE C-umi-
NAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 2. This report then asks the same question this Article
poses (perhaps more diplomatically): "Why then is the criminal caseload of the district
courts the topic of so much attention today?" Id The report goes on to suggest that per-
haps the change in the "character" of federal crime filings (toward drug cases) has in-
creased the workload. Id. at 4, 8-15. However, that tentative suggestion is at least open to
debate. For example, the report notes that the "defendants per case ratio for drug cases"
has in fact declined in recent years. Id. at 8. So has the average length of criminal jury
trials. Id. at 14.
74. Miner, Crime and Punishment, supra note 17, at 685-86. The Armed Career Crim-
inal Act of 1988 dramatically increased penalties for felons possessing firearms in various
contexts, to 30-year or life imprisonment terms. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6460, 102 Stat. 4373
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924(c) (1988)); see generally Cynthia R. Cook, The Armed
Career Criminal Act Amendment A Federal Sentence Enhancement Provision, 12 GEo.
MASON U. L. REv. 99, 104 (1989).
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best exemplifies the proposition that too much crime is prosecuted in
federal courts, it is the area of drug offense prosecution." 75 Judge
Miner deserves great praise for publicly discussing the thorny issues of
federalization, providing detail that is generally absent from most
presentations on the topic. However, precisely why guns and drugs
are singled out for discussion (as opposed to, for example, small bank
robberies or postal thefts) is neither explained nor examined.76
While it is suggested above that the federal criminal workload
problem is not really as "nightmarish" as some critics make it out to
be, it is important to recognize the legitimacy of the concern. Com-
plaints about workload are born of high ideals, not sloth; no one dis-
putes that federal judges today work extremely hard.77 They are
properly concerned about the quality of justice their workloads permit
them to render. Federalization workload concerns are founded on the
idea that too many criminal cases can hinder the exercise of careful
judgment and threaten a reduction in the quality of justice in the fed-
eral system.78 Because achieving just results for litigants is an over-
arching goal of the federal court system (albeit a goal of the states as
well), work pressures that obscure this goal are plainly appropriate
subjects of critique.
However, the point here is that sheer numbers of criminal cases
do not appear to be a primary cause of perceived federal workload
pressures. Based on the available empirical information, one may le-
gitimately question whether some other concern actually drives the
federalization critique. A substantive bias against drug and gun cases,
if one indeed exists, is analytically separate from pure criminal work-
load. Instead, it suggests an unarticulated, substantive conception of
75. Miner, Crime and Punishment, supra note 17, at 683.
76. To be fair, this precise question has not been posed prior to this Article and so
may have escaped attention as a question needing an answer. Also in fairness, in an earlier
article providing a historical account of federalization of crime, Judge Miner noted his
more general view that federal mail fraud and other statutes criminalize conduct "which
would ordinarily be prosecuted in state courts." Miner, Federal Courts, supra note 22, at
121-22 (1987). However, this point appears as an aside to the primary historical account;
Judge Miner's final focus (and ire) in that article again is reserved for federal drug cases:
"local trafficking in controlled substances [has] become grist for the federal prosecutor's
mill." Id. at 124.
77. See supra Part I.A; cf. Rehnquist, supra note 38 (describing federal judges' work-
load in the 1950s).
78. As Professor Beale put it, "the sheer number of drug prosecutions poses a threat
to the federal courts' ability to perform their constitutional role." Beale, Federal Criminal
Caseload, supra note 60, at 7.
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the type of criminal cases federal courts "should" handle.79 This leads
to a separate category of federalization concerns, described below as
"dignity" concerns.80 But first, a variant on the workload theme, de-
scribed here as "open forum" concerns.
B. Open Forum Concerns
There is no doubt that Congress envisions the federal courts play-
ing a significant role in the enforcement of a large number of national
legislative plans. To state but a few examples, environmental protec-
tion, antidiscrimination remedies, management-labor relations, and
securities regulation have all been lodged with the federal courts.81
Federal criminal statutes might also be said to reflect some (cohesive
or otherwise) congressional design for national enforcement. All of
these areas compete for federal judicial resources, and not all the
claims available can possibly be tried in federal court.
In light of the variety of federal legislation enacted without ex-
press hierarchy, it surely is a valid concern if one class of cases (crimi-
nal) pushes out all others, so that the federal forum envisioned by
Congress is unavailable as a matter of reality for other categories.
Federal judges and commentators claim that this is precisely the effect
of federalization of crime on the federal civil docket. Judge Miner of
the Second Circuit states that "judges are unable to get to their civil
calendars." 82 The 1990 Federal Courts Study asserts that "a recent
surge in federal criminal trials... is preventing federal judges in major
metropolitan areas from scheduling civil trials."'83 The proposed 1994
Long Range Plan sounds the same concern, if somewhat muted:
"[C]riminal cases have produced significant delays for civil suits in
some judicial districts." 84
79. See e.g., id. at 7 ("The current federal caseload includes many drug prosecutions
that could and should be brought by state prosecutions in state courts." (emphasis
added)).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 122-151.
81. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (air pollution); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-2000(h)-6 (1994) (civil rights); 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-633a (1987) (labor); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-78111 (1981) (securities).
82. Miner, Crime and Punishment, supra note 17, at 686.
83. 1990 FED. COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 6. This claim apparently was premised
in part on Associate Reporter Professor Beale's 1989 report of predictions from federal
judges and prosecutors that "in the very near future thefir] districts will be unable to try
any civil cases." Beale, Federal Criminal Caseload, supra note 60, at 5.
84. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 9. The Committee also notes that "the
courts have responded" to the problem. Id.
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Despite these assertions by federal court observers, no broad em-
pirical data exists to support their claims. Individualistic anecdotal re-
ports are generally the only support offered for the dire predictions of
civil trial preclusion.85 There is substantial reason to believe that
these claims are exaggerated and far from the norm in most federal
districts. Before acting to close the federal courts to criminal cases
based on open forum concerns, some broader and more scientific sta-
tistical work needs to be done.
For example, the most recent Administrative Office report on
The Criminal Caseload indicates that civil trials still occupy the major-
ity of the trial time of all federal courts.86 This balance was roughly
the same in 1972, thus belying any claim that a new "crisis" of closed
forums is upon us.8 7
(1) General Points
Moreover, there is a subtle yet potentially huge bias in this data.
In a footnote, the Administrative Office notes that it defines "trial"
nonliterally as "any contested proceeding in which evidence is intro-
duced"; thus, all evidentiary "[h]earings on contested motions are re-
ported as trials."' 88 With such a definition, it is not surprising that the
Administrative Office's statistics indicate proportionately more crimi-
nal than civil "trials." 89 Criminal cases often have at least one pretrial
hearing involving contested evidence because many criminal motions
to suppress or to dismiss turn on contested factual issues, which the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require to be resolved before
trial. 90 On the other hand, civil cases almost always proceed without
85. See, e.g., Miner, Crime and Punishment, supra note 17, at 686 ("A judge ... re-
cently told me .... "); Beale, Federal Criminal Caseload, supra note 60, at 5 (citing "reports
from judges and prosecutors in districts with heavy drug caseloads").
86. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 12. Not surprisingly, in a report
designed to address the criminal caseload, this point is stated in the converse: "By 1992,
criminal trials represented more than 47 percent of all trials." Id See also infra text ac-
companying notes 88-92 (discussing the broad and nonliteral definition of "trial" used in
developing this statistic and arguing that it is biased to favor reporting of "trials" in crimi-
nal rather than civil cases).
87. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 12 ("In 1972 criminal trials made up
more than 40 percent of all trials."). In 1992 the figure was 47%. Id.
88. Id. at 12 n.5. Accord LADAR, supra note 61, at 5 n.3.
89. That is, the Administrative Office states that criminal cases make up 15% of all
federal cases filed, yet account for more than 47% of all "trials." Id at 13.
90. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) requires that such motions be raised
prior to trial, and Rule 12(e) states that such motions "shall be determined before trial" in
most cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. Rule 12(e) expressly anticipates that relevant "factual
issues" will be resolved when necessary to such pretrial motions. Id.
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evidentiary hearings because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide for pretrial disposition only by summary judgment, which is
by definition a nonevidentiary mechanism.91 It thus seems undoubt-
able that criminal cases generally must have more contested eviden-
tiary hearings than do civil cases-but these simply are not "trials" as
the term is generally understood. The present statistical comparison
of "trials" in the civil and criminal contexts is thus misleading: it com-
pares apples (civil cases that use a nonevidentiary pretrial disposition
mechanism) with oranges (criminal cases that use contested pretrial
hearings) and then calls only the latter "fruit." The actual figure for
true criminal trials is almost certainly far lower than is currently
reported. 92
Even if all criminal "trials" reported were actual trials, it remains
the fact that more than fifty percent of the federal trial docket is de-
voted to civil trials.93 This hardly supports the claim that federal
judges are not available to try civil cases because criminal cases are
overwhelming them. Of course, it can sometimes occur that a particu-
lar judge becomes mired in an unusually long trial that precludes al-
most all other matters.94 However, such cases are aberrational95 and
individual, not district-wide. Moreover, such exclusionary cases can
91. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c) (providing for judgment when the pleadings demon-
strated "no genuine issue as to any material fact"); see generally William W Schwarzer &
Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1993) (con-
cluding that under appropriate circumstances and used carefully, summary judgment is an
affirmative case management tool); William W Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the
Federal Rules: Defining Genuine issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984) (urging a
more principled approach to the use of Rule 56). There is no equivalent to Rule 56 in the
federal criminal rules. While it has been suggested that summary judgment principles
might profitably be applied in some criminal cases, see James M. Shellow & Susan W.
Brenner, Speaking Motions: Recognition of Summary Judgment in Federal Criminal Proce-
dure, 107 F.R.D. 139, 139 (1986), that theory has yet to catch on in federal criminal cases.
92. For example, the Northern District of California reports that roughly three-
fourths of the nonjury "trials" reported for the district in 1994 were in fact not trials, but
evidentiary hearings. LADAR, supra note 61, at 5. Because such hearings are generally
shorter and less complex than trials, the Administrative Office should consider refining its
data collection mechanisms for "trials."
93. THE CimwnAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 12.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1386 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 330 (1994) (over 16-month trial); Polizzi v. United States, 926 F2d 1311, 1313 (2d
Cir. 1991) (describing 17-month "Pizza Connection" trial, although noting it to be "an ab-
erration in the federal judicial system"). The Polizzi trial was reported to have taken up
265 trial days over 17 months. 926 F.2d at 1313. Thus, it almost certainly did not entirely
exclude the trial judge from other matters, since 265 days averages to less than 16 days per
month, leaving at least one day a week for other judicial business.
95. Polizzi, 926 F.2d at 1313.
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also arise in the civil trial context,96 as well as in state cases. There-
fore, it is a flaw of our legal system in general, not somehow specific to
federal criminal legislation.
In fact, it remains true today as a general matter that the federal
trial docket remains open to many civil trials; more than 10,000 were
conducted in the federal courts in 1992.97 Nor has any federal district
where the criminal dockets are abnormally large ever suspended all
civil trials because of criminal caseload emergencies. 98
Two other related points deserve brief mention. First, respected
federal trial judge Edward Rafeedie has recently written that
"[a]lmost all jury trials take from two to three times longer than they
should."99 This suggests that, rather than closing the federal court-
house doors, more efficient trial management techniques may provide
some solution to the concerns about the availability of federal
courts.100
96. See McLAUGHLAN, supra note 41, at 165 ("[O]ne antitrust case can tie a judge up
for years, and it can become nearly the only case the judge can manage during that
period.").
97. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 12 fig. 12. This averages to roughly
100 civil trials annually in each of the 94 federal districts in the country, two per week.
98. While it does not identify the districts, the Administrative Office reports that in
three districts (out of 94) in 1992, more than 80% of the trials conducted were criminal
(including, of course, nontrial criminal evidentiary hearings, see supra text accompanying
notes 88-92). THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 29, at 13. The three districts are al-
most certainly southern border districts, however, and a single category of criminal conduct
clearly predominates in these border districts: immigration offenses. While many districts
have criminal immigration caseloads in the single digits, in 1994 California's four district
courts had 671 (424 in San Diego alone), Texas's four district courts had 481 (224 in Hous-
ton), and Arizona's single district court had 177. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 1994 FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS tbl. D-3. This total of 1,369
criminal immigration cases represented more than 50% of the 2,596 such cases filed in all
the federal courts in 1994. Id.; see also MCLAUGHLAN, supra note 41, at 121 (noting that
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, where these districts lie, historically have had high criminal
filings, presumably largely immigration cases). But of all possibly "dual jurisdiction" fed-
eral criminal offenses, immigration offenses seem most clearly "federal" rather than state
in character, so that defederalization seems unlikely if not inappropriate. Moreover, it
seems clear that the immigration issues in this country today demand solutions far beyond
simply deciding whether or not to federalize criminal conduct that is an outgrowth of a far
broader social issue.
99. Edward Rafeedie, Speedier Trials, LrrIG., Fall 1994, at 6.
100. The need for further implementation of management techniques may provide
some response to the odd statistical point made in THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note
29, at 9, that while single defendant cases average 178 minutes of court time, multiple
defendant criminal cases average 347 minutes per defendant. Gently described by the Ad-
ministrative Office as a "diseconomy of scale," this unexplained inefficiency in multi-de-
fendant cases would seem to require strong management attention, not simply acceptance.
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Second, contrary to an oft-invoked myth, 01 the 1970 Speedy Trial
Act simply does not, as a general matter, force delay in civil cases. 02
Because the Speedy Trail Act provides for generous exclusions of time
that are often invoked, federal criminal cases are often not tried
within the statutory deadline of seventy days; in fact, the average time
for disposition of federal criminal cases is more than five months. 0 3
This average necessarily includes those criminal cases simple enough
to resolve quickly; for cases of any complexity, the Speedy Trial Act
itself provides for an exclusion of time that is frequently invoked.' °4
Thus, as Professor George Bridges concluded in a 1982 study, "the
Act has had no independent effect on the volume or flow of civil liti-
gation in federal courts."' 05
(2) One District's Experience
Perhaps because more extensive or accurate empirical data about
civil versus criminal trials is lacking, "open forum" arguments against
federalization are often based on anecdotal evidence. 0 6 Although un-
persuasive on general propositions, such anecdotal evidence may also
be cited to prove the contrary point: that federal criminal cases are
not barring civil litigants from being heard in federal court. On a re-
cent random morning (Tesday, January 24, 1995), a visit to the fed-
eral courthouse in San Francisco revealed that not one of the nine
judges or five magistrate judges was holding a criminal trial that
101. E.g., Beale, Federal Criminal Caseload, supra note 60, at 4-5 (stating that dead-
lines imposed by the Speedy Trial Act force criminal trials and criminal pretrial proceed-
ings to take precedence over civil trials); 1990 FED. COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 36
(claiming that because of the Speedy Trial Act, federal courts "with heavy drug caseloads
are virtually unable to try civil cases and others will soon be at that point").
102. The Speedy Trial Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. MICHA. V. Borm, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD: A FrvE-YR_ R REviEw,
1989-1993, at 7 (1994). The Speedy 'rial Act provides in relevant part that "the trial of a
defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall
commence within seventy days" of indictment or first appearance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)
(1985 & Supp. 1995). Subsection (h) of § 3161 provides, however, that "[t]he following
periods of delay shall be excluded in computing th[is] time," and nine detailed and com-
monplace periods of delay are then listed.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) provides that a judge deciding whether to grant a
continuance may consider whether a case is "so complex, due to the number of defendants,
the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation ... within the time limits" of the Act.
105. George S. Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal
Criminal Litigation, 73 J. Crum. L. & CRIMIOLOGY 50,72 n.68 (1982) (citing other studies
as well).
106. See supra note 85.
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day.107 Twelve of the fourteen judges' courtrooms were dark; two
others were in use for federal civil trials.' 08 Moreover, there were
nine additional, unassigned courtrooms in this particular federal
courthouse that were available and yet dark. Ironically, one federal
courtroom was being used for a criminal trial-but it was a state crimi-
nal trial in which venue had been transferred from Sacramento to San
Francisco.1 09
It is virtually certain that the federal judges not in court on Janu-
ary 24th in San Francisco were otherwise engaged with court business.
This maybe conceded without distorting the point; that these federal
judges were not engaged in a criminal trial and a number of court-
rooms were available for civil trials. Indeed, on this particular day in
this particular district, the only federal trials occurring were civil.
Of course one swallow does not a summer make,"x0 and one day's
experience cannot be generalized into a broad empirical statement.
But this anecdotal experience appears to be accurate for the Northern
District of California as a general matter. The 1993-1994 statistical
report for that district states that "[t]here is no empirical evidence that
the present criminal caseload poses a problem for the civil docket....
[C]ivil litigants [receive] a trial forum without undue delay. ... ""I
107. On-site survey conducted by Professor Rory Little (Jan. 24, 1995) (notes on file
with Hastings Law Journal). The San Francisco-based federal judges on that date were
Chief Judge Henderson; Judges Conti, Orrick, Weigel, Patel, Lynch, Legge, Walker, and
Smith; and Magistrate Judges Langford, Brennan, Brazil, Hamilton and Woodruff. The
other trial judges of the Northern District sit in Oakland or San Jose. It is of course possi-
ble that these judges were in fact in the middle of a criminal trial but were simply not
sitting that day for some reason. However, the published calendar for that week states that
only two judges were even scheduled for a criminal trial that day (Judge Patel and Magis-
trate Judge Hamilton). THE RECORDER (S.F.), Jan. 24, 1995, at 15. Moreover, although
Judge Patel's posted calendar indicated a scheduled criminal trial, her courtroom was dark.
This is not unusual nor is it a point of criticism. In fact, federal litigators are well aware
that criminal trials are often continued or resolved on the eve of trial, so that the court-
rooms remain dark despite published schedules indicating trial.
108. Courtrooms of Judges Orrick and Smith.
109. People v. Nguyen, No. Cr.109842 (Sacramento Super. Ct.), No. 156754 (S.F.
Super. Ct.), Judge W.J. Harpham (ret.) presiding. That the federal courthouse was made
available for the state trial is an encouraging example of state-federal resource sharing.
110. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics bk. 1, ch. 7, in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 78 (J. Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
111. LADAR, supra note 61, at 2-3. Other districts, with abnormal criminal filings, have
reported to the contrary. See United States v. Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. 962, 965 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (noting that in that district, "criminal filings have increased at a rate far greater than
the national average" and reporting that an "advisory group has determined that the crimi-
nal docket is the principle cause of unnecessary delay and expense in the civil justice sys-
tem within the Eastern District").
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San Francisco is a major metropolitan area and is in the upper
third of federal districts in the country for trials conducted.1 2 Absent
some contrary empirical evidence, it would seem likely that its federal
caseload and forum pressures are more typical than aberrational;
rather, the three (out of ninety-four) federal districts that are suffering
high open forum pressures are likely atypical." 3
(3) Why Not Try a Master Calendar?
One substantial bar to conducting more federal trials may be the
present federal adherence to an individual judge case management
system, as opposed to the "master calendar" assignment system used
in many state courts, including California." 4 No judge can try more
than one case at a time. Under an individual assignment system, if a
criminal case is being tried, no other case can be tried by that judge
even if the case is ready to go." 5 If a case set for trial pleads or settles
on the eve of trial, the scheduled trial time usually goes unused and
the courtroom stays dark." 6
112. LADAR, supra note 61, at 5 (district ranks 33 out of 94 federal districts in trials
conducted); see also supra note 98 (the Northern District of California ranks 16 nationally
in total criminal filings).
113. There reportedly were three federal districts in 1994 in which criminal "trials"
represented more than 80% of the total trial time. See supra note 98. Not coincidentally,
immigration problems noticeably skew many governmental functions in these districts be-
sides federal courtroom resources. Id; see also California Sues U.S. Government over
Costs Tied to Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Tmns, May 1, 1994, at A24; Larry Rohter, Florida Seeks
U.S. Aid for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TMEs, Dec. 31, 1993, at A12; Sam H. Verhovek,
Texas Plans to Sue U.S. over Illegal Alien Costs, N.Y. TnMms, May 27, 1994, at A10.
114. In an individual case management system, every case is assigned to a particular
judge from the day it is filed until the day it is disposed of. In contrast, a master calendar
system does not assign cases to any particular judges, but rather uses whatever judge is
available to perform whatever functions (for example, arraignment, discovery, motions,
settlement, and trial) are needed along the way. See generally Richard Enslen, Should
Judges Manage Their Own Caseloads?, 70 JurICArunp 200, 200 (1987); Robert F.
Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Dis-
covery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RuTGERS L. REv. 253, 257 (1985).
115. There are presently some stalwart federal judges, such as the Honorable James C.
Ware in the Northern District of California (San Jose Division), who will try two cases on
the same day, running a criminal case from 8 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., and a civil case from 1:30
p.m. to 6 p.m. Such a schedule is obviously exhausting and impossible to manage for very
long; it is also hard on support personnel and, perhaps, on jurors. Judge fatigue might well
lead to greater trial errors. Most significantly, however, despite such herculean efforts,
such a schedule is still limited to the trial of only two cases by that judge, even if five or ten
stand ready for trial.
116. Of course, this need not be the case; a single judge can also double or triple sched-
ule trials on her own calendar. This is likely more inconvenient and expensive to the par-
ties (who must prepare whether their case goes to trial or not) than is a master calendar
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By contrast, a master calendar assignment system permits trial of
a large number of cases simultaneously, limited only by the total
number of judges or courtrooms available for trial. In California state
courts for example, many cases are often scheduled for the same trial
dates. This guarantees that some case is definitely ready on any given
date, so that a courtroom does not go unused. If four judges are avail-
able, then four cases can be tried. Trials are not tied to the schedule of
a single judge." 7
The individual judge assignment system is reportedly a relatively
recent development in the federal system." 8 The use of this system
may indicate that other values are viewed as more important than sim-
ply trying cases as quickly as possible." 9 Yet federal jurisdictions
have used master calendar systems in the past, specifically to respond
to a perceived caseload crisis. 20
Undoubtedly it would be advisable to gather more empirical evi-
dence to better evaluate current open forum concerns. For example,
data on days actually spent in trial by federal judges is not readily
available. 121 As it now stands, however, there is substantial reason to
assignment system, however, since the single judge is the only one available and the
number of possible trials is therefore capped at one.
117. As an example, if Judge A is trying a criminal case under a master calendar system
while a case before Judge B pleads out, Judge B can immediately be assigned to try one of
Judge A's other cases if one is ready to be tried. Of course, even a master calendar system
does not end all delays; the number of judges and courtrooms is finite. Thus, California
state litigants still face substantial delays in getting their cases to trial. Yet, the master
calendar system is the only way California state courts handle the caseload they have,
which is significantly greater than that of federal courts. See supra text accompanying
notes 61-63. Single judge assignment is a luxury that federal courts can afford only because
their caseloads are so relatively low.
118. Judge Peckham states that "in 1969, most metropolitan federal district courts
changed over from a master calendar system to an individual assignment system."
Peckham, supra note 114, at 257.
119. Thus, Judges Enslen and Peckham argue that an individual assignment system
develops continuity, expertise, and a sense of responsibility for disposition of the assigned
cases, all of which may in turn foster more efficient litigation. Enslen, supra note 114, at
201; Peckham, supra note 114, at 254. Professor Resnik, on the other hand, has raised
significant concerns about "managerial judging" in individual assignment systems. Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. Rnv. 374 (1982).
120. See LADAR, supra note 61, at 4 n.2 (noting use of a "master calendar" system in
the Northern District of California in 1968-1969 to respond to the large influx of selective
service cases: "15 criminal cases [ready] for trial ... each Monday [were] spread among the
7 judges available .... ").
121. For example, the length of federal "trials" reported by the Administrative Office
appears to include days during which the trial was still not completed but, for one reason
or another, court was not actually in session, thus inflating the figures. See also supra text
accompanying notes 61-63 (data defines any evidentiary hearing as a "trial").
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believe that the "open forum" concerns expressed with regard to fed-
eralization of crime are overstated.
C. Dignity Concerns
Some critics of federalization express the view that federal judges
should not have to deal with "ordinary" street crimes because such
crimes "should not be enough to involve a federal court's atten-
tion."1 2  These critics posit, however, that other criminal cases-
"cases of clear national import and interest"-properly fall within the
scope of federal concern. 123 Such views are tied to a conception that
federal courts have a "distinctive" role among all courts and that fed-
eral courts are "a superlative court system.., that attracts the most
talented lawyers."'124 Advocates that couch their criticisms of federali-
zation in these terms are in essence concerned with the dignity of fed-
eral courts and judges.
There may well be a core to such dignity concerns that captures a
real and valid, if difficult to describe, shared value in our conception
of federal courts. Many view federal courts, historically and contem-
poraneously, as special or distinctive. Thus, almost twenty years ago,
Professor Burt Neuborne challenged "the myth of parity" between
state and federal courts.1 25
This Article does not take issue with the grand aspirations of fed-
eral courts (although it should be noted that many state courts share
122. 1992 JUDICAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 7, 29; 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
note 4, at 21 (arguing that in order to merit federal jurisdiction a crime should have "sub-
stantial multistate or international aspects"). See also Mordecai Rosenfeld, The Law and
the Yucca Yucca Plant, N.Y. L.., June 16, 1989, at 2 (reporting Chief Justice Rehnquist's
statements that "garden variety crimes d[o] not belong in federal court").
123. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 19.
124. Id. at 6, 19.
125. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977). Rather than
advance a strong absolute claim (eg., that federal courts are "better" than state courts for
all purposes), Professor Neuborne's thesis was more limited: that federal courts are better
than state courts at "enforcing countermajoritarian checks in a sustained, effective man-
ner," and at evaluating "individual[ ] ... challenges to collective decisions." Id. at 1131.
Even when limited to constitutional adjudication, however, the lack-of-parity thesis has
been questioned by other scholars. E.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Con-
stitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605 (1981); Michael E. Solimine & James
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of
Judicial Parity, 10 HAStiNGS CONsT. L.Q. 213 (1983). Professor Chemerinsky contends
that "the debate about parity is unresolvable because ... there is no empirical answer."
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. Rnv. 233, 236, (1988). This Article does not pretend to settle, nor do its argu-
ments depend upon settlement of, the parity debate.
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such a aspirations126). However, a concept of federal court dignity can
quickly slide into an unanalyzed elitist-sounding position that detracts
from a substantive analysis of the difficult questions confronting the
federal courts today.
The 1994 draft of the Long Range Plan for the federal judiciary
occasionally exhibits such unanalyzed excesses. 127 For example, the
Plan begins with the assertion (without citation) that federal courts
were intended to handle only "small numbers of disputes involving
important national interests" and that federal judges are "specially se-
lected for the job of performing . ..difficult counter-majoritarian
tasks."'1 28 Yet, not only is the specialness of the procedure not ex-
plained, 129 but how or why this might relate to disqualifying the fed-
eral courts from particular types of criminal cases is never
explicated. 130 Throughout the Long Range Plan, the federal courts
126. Professor Resnik has noted, for example, that some state courts have responded
to issues of race, gender, and ethnicity ahead of the federal courts. Judith Resnik, Reread-
ing "The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End
of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1041 (1994); see also id. at 1050 & n.131
(noting "rejuvenational state adjudication and.., development of constitutional norms").
127. The 1994 Long Range Plan is the most recent and perhaps the most prestigious
explication of the anti-federalization position, built upon prior expositions by the 1990 Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee, the Federal Judicial Center, and other august bodies. See
1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 2, 4 n.1 (referencing prior works influencing and
supporting the planning process); supra note 39 (further describing the Long Range Plan).
It thus seems fair and useful to focus on the Long Range Plan as representative of consid-
ered and broadly shared views.
128. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 4. Similarly, the Plan states that federal
courts "are special purpose courts." Id. Thus, the Plan presumes, ipse dixit, a "special"
status for federal courts even as it fails to explain just what the special purposes are or how
they have been identified.
129. The concept of "specialness" here is difficult to understand: judgeships are highly
sought after in most jurisdictions, state as well as federal, and each jurisdiction likely con-
siders its selection process special. And it is highly debatable whether the current federal
judicial selection process focuses particularly well or "specially" on persons exceptionally
able to perform "counter-majoritarian tasks." See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (criticizing the
increased incidence of political posturing by judges); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIR-
MATION MESS: CLEANING Up THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1994) (criticizing the
selection process for Supreme Court Justices). Most attorneys that receive federal judicial
nominations have been "mainstream" players and have been deeply involved in, and re-
sponsive to, "majoritarian" politics. That some federal judges have been successful in with-
standing political pressures after their appointment is true, but is likely attributable to
constitutional life tenure protection, rather than to any special selection procedures.
130. See also 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 3 ("preeminent legal compe-
tence"). The Long Range Plan also extols the federal courts as "a superlative court system
with superior resources that attracts the most talented lawyers .... Id. at 6. It is unclear
whether this last reference is intended to describe lawyers that become federal judges or
those that practice in federal courts; either conception is arguable and unsupported. In
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are referred to as "distinctive," without any development of precisely
what the distinctions are or upon what premises they are founded.131
Such a feeling of distinctive federal court superiority seems to
manifest itself quite specifically in the debate over the federalization
of crime. Thus, the Long Range Plan recommends that criminal con-
duct with only a "minor" effect on interstate commerce should "not
be enough to involve a federal court's attention.' 32 Similarly, Judge
Miner "object[s] to... the use of the federal courts for the prosecu-
tion of street-corner sales . . . [and other] small-quantity transac-
tions";133 and the 1990 Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
bemoans the prosecution of "minor [drug] cases" in federal court.' 34
Indeed, current anti-federalization sources are uniform in this
message; an outside reader cannot help but get the impression that
some crimes (which ones, other than drugs, are seldom specified) are
simply viewed as too trivial and therefore beneath the federal courts'
attention.
The resonations of this claim are disturbing, more so perhaps be-
cause they are inexplicit and inferential. 35 Of course, a great deal of
serious crime has little perceivable effect on interstate commerce.
Historically it has not been a "significant" impact on interstate com-
merce that motivates a great deal of specific federal criminal legisla-
contrast, the "superior resources" point is not arguable: the federal courts today have far
more dollars per judge-although some view this as part of the national problem-making
their resources "superior" to overburdened state systems. See Kaye, supra note 5. But
surely there are talented and dedicated state judges, and their achievements are perhaps
even more admirable given their far more strained resource situation. The point here is
not to dispute the assertions, but rather to take issue with their implication: that federal
courts or judges are "better" and therefore should not have to handle "trivial" criminal
cases. I wish to at least question this claim as a reason for restricting federal criminal
jurisdiction. Indeed, if federal courts and judges are in fact "better" than their state coun-
terparts, one might argue that they should handle more criminal cases in a time of national
crime and/or judicial resource emergencies.
131. E.g., 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 18, 19; see also id at 11 (referenc-
ing the "special nature" of the federal court system without precisely explaining it). Some
federal court advocates may take the position that if you have to ask, then you can't under-
stand. This is, however, surely an unsatisfying response to genuine concerns.
132. Id. at 21.
133. Miner, Crime and Punishment, supra note 17, at 683.
134. 1990 FED. Cotrs STuDY, supra note 3, at 37.
135. This Article is certainly not the first to note this inferential point (although it may
be the most blunt). See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Federalism Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1207,
1210 (1994) (arguing that "modest" state court decisions are considered by federal courts
to be "unworthy of the attention of the federal judge"); Judith Resnik, Rereading "The
Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the
71ventieth Century, 47 VANR. L. REv. 1021, 1052 (1994) (noting that "many judges ...
argue that what is on the federal docket is not worth their time").
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tion or prosecutions. 136 Indeed, the federal civil rights prosecutions
championed today, even by opponents of federalization, 137 were often
state "street crimes" such as assault or murder.' 38 The federal courts
were asked to intervene not because the individual cases were non-
trivial, but because as a class they threatened a shared national inter-
est or aspiration. 139
Today, however, it is a different set of "traditionally local"
crimes, 40 such as guns on our streets and drugs in our inner cities, that
have reached epidemic proportions on a national scale. Local authori-
ties are crying out for federal assistance.' 41 From what legitimate
source may a principle be drawn that such crimes nevertheless remain
beneath the attention level of our federal courts?
Indeed, even the Long Range Plan is unconsciously schizophrenic
on this score. While arguing against federalization of offenses with
"minor" impact on interstate commerce, the Plan trumpets federal
judges as "'keepers of the covenant' and guardians of American con-
stitutionalism" for their heroism in enforcing "the law of the land" in
136. Thus, one of the earliest dual jurisdiction federal crimes, mail fraud, codified at 18
U.S.C. 1341 (1988 & Supp V 1993), requires no effect at all on interstate commerce. Simi-
larly, the post-Civil War civil rights statutes require no interstate effects. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 241-42 (1988). Indeed, in 1971 the Supreme Court expressly ruled that no interstate com-
merce effects at all were required for any particular federal loan sharking prosecutions (so
long as the "class" of activities had a cumulative effect), so that "trivial" cases could not be
precluded from the federal courts. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971).
137. E.g., 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 5, 22.
138. To take a well-known example, aside from its videotaped prominence and the
identity of the assailants, the 1993 Rodney King beating in Los Angeles was little different
than hundreds of assaults prosecuted in state courts every day. Disturbing as it is, the fact
that the assailants were local police officers does not intrinsically suggest special federal
concern. Similarly, the crime in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (sheriffs beat
an arrestee to death) while assuredly horrible was simply a homicide, devoid of interstate
commerce impact and normally entrusted to the states for prosecution. What made federal
prosecution appropriate in Screws, however, was a failure of state authorities to effectively
deal with the problem; see infra text accompanying notes 236-247 (proposing this as an
appropriate federalization principle). Indeed, the defendants in Screws were the state's
local law enforcement authorities. 325 U.S. at 113 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result).
139. E.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (the "class of activities" enabled federal prosecution)
(emphasis omitted); Screws, 325 U.S. at 112 (civil rights statutes are "designed to secure
individuals their constitutional rights").
140. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (describing loan sharking subject to federal prosecution).
141. For only a small sample, see, e.g., Valerie Alvord, Reno Is Told Jails, Prosecutors
Needed Here, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 14, 1994, at B1; Julio Barretto, Jr., & Janet E.
Quist, Cities Need Money to Fight Drugs, J. STATE GOV'T, Apr. 1990, at 50; Paul Chevigny,
Let's Make It a Federal Case: Police Brutality, NATION, Mar. 23, 1992, at 370; Mitch
Gelman & Jill Dutt, Ready to Cash In; Hoping for More from D.C., NEWSDAY, Feb. 7,
1993, at 25.
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the South in the 1950s.142 This Article would certainly join in this
praise.143 Yet it cannot be gainsaid that much of that heroism was in
fact federal "interference" in "local" affairs, involving matters of local
violence with minor or no connections to interstate commerce. 144 De-
spite this fact, and apparently to preserve specially such civil rights
prosecutions in the federal courts while otherwise condemning feder-
alization, the Long Range Plan suggests a separate principle of federal
criminal jurisdiction, vaguely yet clearly designed to capture such
cases: "criminal cases raising highly sensitive local issues."'145
The debate regarding the federalization of civil rights offenses
was heated in 1870-and in 1950. Yet critics of federalization today
do not question the federalization of this particular class of local of-
fenses. 46 However, the principle set forth in the Long Range Plan
142. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 5. Of course, state judges also generally
swear an oath to defend the United States Constitution, and many take that oath as seri-
ously as do federal judges. Professor Neuborne's masterful article, supra note 125, is wor-
thy of updating, it may be that the aspirational description of federal courts and judges has
increasingly diminishing validity as a "principle of federalization" today.
143. See JACK BASs, UmNLmLY HEROES (1981) for an inspirational account of the
hero federal judges.
144. Thus, the dissenters in Screws began their heated critique of the federalization
(without using the term, of course) of the brutal murder of a black man by a Georgia
county sheriff by stating the issue as "whether this patently local crime can be made the
basis of a federal prosecution." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 139 (1945) (Roberts,
Frankfurter, & Jackson, JJ., dissenting). In the related civil context, the discriminatory
conduct reached by the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 was presumed to be "of purely
local character" in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
("Congress may... prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers no matter
how 'local' their operations may appear").
1 145. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21. The comment following this princi-
ple expressly references "the height of the civil rights era," id. at 22, and in a veiled refer-
ence to the Rodney King case and the attendant riots in Los Angeles, supra note 138,
states that "[e]ven today, some civil rights actions, because of their potential for explosive-
ness in the community, may be more effectively handled by the national government." lId
at 22. But the King case was tried (the second time) by the federal district court in the
same local Los Angeles community (indeed, more local than the Simi Valley community to
which the state trial had been transferred). Precisely what was "more effective" about that
is unexplained. Nor does this comment address whether initial prosecution of that assault
case in federal court would have satisfied the Plan's limited federalization principles. If
not, why not? If so, why?
146. Neither, of course, does this Article; it takes the more affirmative position, on a
principled basis, that such criminal cases are entirely proper in federal court when federal
constitutional rights are violated and there is a failure of adequate state prosecution. See
infra text accompanying notes 236-247.
In a creative and wonderfully revivifying article, Professor Akhil Amar has recently
argued that there may be a constitutional requirement that civil rights offenses be federal-
ized-although he does not use that term-based on Section 5 of the 14th Amendment.
Akhil R. Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95
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("highly sensitive issues in the local community"'147) is little more than
an ipse dixit. This is apparent simply by way of current example. To-
day, gun and drug cases would seem to fall within the plain language
of "criminal cases raising highly sensitive local issues." Most Ameri-
cans today report that their fears are higher regarding these local
criminal offenses than any other.148 But the message of the Long
Range Plan and other current anti-federalizationists seems to be that
they do not want these particular "local" crimes in federal courts.
Thus, unless the stated principle simply means that civil rights cases
are an exception, then the Plan's linguistic formulation fails to distin-
guish (with any clarity or by any principle) the civil rights prosecutions
it endorses from its overall anti-federalization position.
The Long Range Planning Committee is surely correct in its gen-
eral view that no court's resources-state or federal-should be
squandered on cases that do not warrant the expenditure of scarce
resources. 149 In this sense, as well as in light of their relatively small
numbers and high level of achievement, federal courts surely are spe-
cial resources that ought not be squantered. Thus, substantial compo-
nents of the Long Range Plan's concerns are valid, and the
Committee is to be admired for undertaking the daunting task of plan-
ning for a future that threatens the quality of justice in all of the court
systems in this country.
Yet, having a separate, available forum to handle criminal cases
when state or local systems fail may also be vital to "Our Federal-
ism."'1 50 Federal legislative or enforcement policies based on an ex-
pansive concept of the "dignity" of federal courts are unprincipled,
founded on unarticulated and disputable premises, and ignore too
large a portion of our existing criminal justice system: talented and
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16-20 (1995). At bottom, this idea seems to be based on a theory of
constitutional incorporation of a concept of state failure (see id. at 17), the same prudential
principle proposed by this Article.
147. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21.
148. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, in this Symposium Issue (noting current opinion polls).
149. This idea is already recognized in nonprosecution and noncriminal "diversion"
policies, designed to shunt criminal violations deemed inconsequential or not serious
enough out of the criminal courts. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844a (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (au-
thorizing purely civil penalties for possession of a "personal use amount" of controlled
substances); infra note 196 (noting federal nonprosecution policy for single-auto thefts).
150. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,43-44 (1971); see Amar & Marcus, supra note 146.
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struggling state courts. There is an implied elitist and self-protection-
ist component of this message that seems entirely illegitimate.' 5'
D. Federalism Concerns
A final set of concerns about federalization of crime emerge from
the traditional view of the constitutional conception of the union. The
federal government, it is said, was created only to address limited and
plainly national problems and its courts ought not interfere in state or
local affairs without good reason and clear textual support from the
Constitution.152 Alexander Hamilton offered the initial part of this
idea with specific regard to crime in Federalist No. 17, as a reason to
not think of the proposed federal government as "too powerful.' 53
151. Or as Chief Judge Kaye of the New York State Court of Appeals recently put it, a
position that "as long as the whole system is in trouble, why not at least save the Federal
courts?" is simply "Federalism Gone Wild." Kaye, supra note 5. "A solution that eases
the burden on the Federal courts without taking into account the effect on the state court
system is no solution at all." Id. Other state judges have occasionally expressed similar
unhappiness with the federal judiciary's view of state courts. See, e.g., Kentucky Chief
Justice Robert F. Stephens, Commentary on "Planning for the State and Federal Courts".
The Additional Problem of Federal Legislation, 78 VA. L. REv. 1883, 1883 (1992) (noting
"a residual attitude problem" among federal judges vis-a-vis their state counterparts).
152. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954). "IT]he conception of the central government as one of dele-
gated, limited authority" seems settled enough to not require further support. HART AND
WEc-SR's T-m FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 533 (Paul M. Bator et al.,
3d ed. 1988). Yet, the literature on "federalism" has grown vast over the past decade; some
have suggested that a "rereading" is necessary and that "the reality is that the states have
become sub-divisions ... of the federal government." Resnik, supra note 135, at 1049
(1994). The bland account in the text is not intended to endorse any particular side in the
inevitable debates regarding conceptions of federalism. See, eg., Ann Althouse, Variations
on a Theory of Normative Federalism A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DULKE L.. 979, 980
(1993) (discussing "normative federalism"); Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federal-
ism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426-27 (1987) (proposing to "counter the Supreme Court's ver-
sion of federalism" with a "neo-Federalist" view); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law, 74 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1988) (proposing "federalist" and "na-
tionalist" models of judicial federalism). The debate is too current and fractured to re-
solve. See generally Symposium, Federalism's Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1994).
But even the traditional account of federalism supports (as this Article contends) a
broader conception of federalization than currently is in vogue. A "less federalist" concep-
tion might, as well. Professors Rubin and Feely have recently argued that "federalism,"
apart from simple decentralization of authority, ought to have no significant bearing on
determining national policies today. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994). This conception might
support broad federalization of crimes (an effect possibly not intended by the authors) and
thus might be generally supportive of themes in this Article; however, it is a theory unex-
plored by, and unnecessary to, this Article.
153. Hamilton stated that "[t]here is one transcendent advantage belonging to the
province of the state governments .... I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and
civil justice." Id. at 155. Tim FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The Tenth Amendment, reserving undelegated powers to the States,
seems to embody this idea explicitly.154 In the context of criminal law,
Justice Stewart perhaps said it best in his 1971 dissent in United States
v. Perez,5 5 a case involving a federal prosecution of a local loan shark
who operated solely in a small neighborhood in Brooklyn:
[T]he Framers of the Constitution never intended that the National
Government might define as a crime and prosecute... wholly local
activity through the enactment of federal criminal laws .... [I]t is
not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all
crime is a national problem.156
Significantly, however, Justice Stewart was the lone dissenter in
Perez, and Perez virtually ended the debate about the scope of federal
authority to enact criminal laws. 157 Thus, the debate today focuses not
on constitutional barriers to federalization, but rather on a search for
154. The Tenth Amendment provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991)
(discussing Tenth Amendment and federalism); Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. Rnv.
84, 95 (1985) (noting the Tenth Amendment's limited value as a constitutional basis for
states' rights). Cf Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth
Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 344 (1987) (explicating theory of the Ninth Amend-
ment as a defense against both state and federal governments). However, the Supreme
Court long ago rejected Tenth Amendment arguments as a bar to assertion of federal crim-
inal jurisdiction over dual jurisdiction crimes. Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188
U.S. 321, 357-58 (1903) (upholding 1895 federal act criminalizing interstate transportation
of lottery tickets, while explicitly noting the substantive "evils" of gambling and the states'
power to forbid it). Champion, while well-settled, was not an easy or self-evident case; it
was decided 5-4 and was argued three times to the Supreme Court. See 188 U.S. at 321
(noting argument and rearguments).
155. 402 U.S. 146 (1957).
156. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). While
perhaps stating it best, however, Justice Stewart was not the first to advance such an idea.
See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 354 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The government
created by the Constitution was not designed for the regulation of matters of purely local
concern.").
157. Perez established the proposition that Congress has constitutional authority to
reach discrete "local" criminal episodes that are wholly intrastate, at least when it makes
findings that the "class of activities" addressed has significant effects in bulk on interstate
commerce. 402 U.S. at 154-57. Perez has long been viewed as ending debate as to congres-
sional power to "federalize" local criminal conduct. See Stern, supra note 2, at 283-85. But
the pressures placed on federal courts today by a dramatic increase in firearms and narcot-
ics cases prosecuted under this theory has reinvigorated the old debate. Thus, the scope of
Congress's criminal authority under its interstate commerce powers was recently revisited
in United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 LEXIS 3039 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995), in which the
Court struck down federalization of certain gun possession crimes in schools. Congress's
failure to make any commerce findings in enacting the law at issue in Lopez apparently
leaves open the question whether Congress lacks absolute authority to regulate simple
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
prudential principles to guide inevitable congressional efforts to feder-
alize crime.
Any federalism concerns must note the fact that federalization of
crime is not new.158 The authors of the Constitution plainly envi-
sioned a body of federal criminal law.159 The statutes of the First Con-
gress from 1789 to 1790, which created a number of dual jurisdiction
federal crimes, were enacted by bodies whose membership was drawn
substantially from the Constitution's signers. 60 While the Framers al-
most certainly foresaw a lesser federal role for the federal courts in
criminal law than exists today, 61 this is just as certainly true with re-
gard to every area in which the Framers expressed a vision.162 How-
ever, if "federalization" means creating federal jurisdiction over
crimes that might also be prosecuted by the States, then it has been
going on since the First Congress.
For example, in its first month (July 1789), the First Congress en-
acted federal criminal statutes encompassing bribery and false state-
ments. 63 After recessing from September until February 1790, the
Congress then enacted federal criminal statutes encompassing, inter
alia, murder, maiming, theft, fraud, and even receiving stolen prop-
erty. 64 Of course, these statutes had, as all federal criminal statutes
firearms possession. Compare iL at * 56-57 (Kennedy, J., concurring) with id at *65
(Thomas, J., concurring).
158. It is necessary to discourse on this point because a contrary "newness" argument
tends to underlie current anti-federalization literature. See e.g., Stephen Chippendale,
Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L.
Rnv. 455, 458 (1994).
159. See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (counterfeiting and piracy); id. § 9 (a form of
bribery); id. art. H, § 3 (treason). A number of procedural provisions of the Constitution
also plainly anticipate federal criminal cases, laws, and trials. E.g., id. art. I, §§ 9,10; id. art.
II, § 2; id art. III, § 2; id art. IV, § 2.
160. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESs 3, 16-17, 100-101 (1834) (listing Constitution signers
and the subsequently seated members of Senate and House including, for example, James
Madison of Virginia).
161. See, e.g., Tim FEDERALIST No. 17, at 118-20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) (arguing that the federal government is quite unlikely to be interested in
S.regulation of the mere domestic police of a state" and that "the ordinary administration
of criminal... justice" lies within "the province of the state governments").
162. Not to mention significant areas where the Framers could have had no clear vi-
sion, e.g., securities regulation (15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff (1981)), wiretapping (18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 et seq. (1970 & Supp. 1995)). See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418
(1992) ("The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been
unimaginable to the Framers .... ").
163. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 46.
164. See 1 Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 2, 1 Stat. 102 (false census returns); Act of Apr.
30, 1790, ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 113 (murder); Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 5, 1 Stat. 113 (theft);
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 13, 1 Stat. 115 (maiming); Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 14, 1
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must have for proper federal jurisdiction, a connection to stated fed-
eral interests. 165 But that merely masks the fact that these were
"state" crimes gone federal, because a number of the First Congress's
criminal statutes applied without regard to geography or exclusive
federal control.166
This federalization pattern can be traced over the next two hun-
dred years. Nonexhaustive highlights include making assaults and
other civil rights offenses federal crimes after the Civil War;167 federal-
izing financial frauds in 1872;168 the Mann Act federalizing prostitu-
tion offenses in 1910;169 federalization of dangerous drug offenses
starting in 1914;170 and bank robberies "going federal" in 1934.171
Stat. 115 (forgery, counterfeiting, and uttering); Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 15, 1 Stat. 115
(more theft and falsification); Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 16, 1 Stat. 116 (general theft);
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 17, 1 Stat. 116 (receipt of stolen property); Act of Apr. 30,
1790, ch. 9, § 18, 1 Stat. 116 (perjury).
165. Thus, most (but not all, see infra note 166) of the foregoing offenses applied to
federal employees, to federal property, or to locations "under the sole and exclusive juris-
diction of the United States." E.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 46; Act of Apr.
30, 1790, ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 113. Similarly, the First Congress generally envisioned federal
district court jurisdiction as "exclusive[ ] of the courts of the several states," not dual. See
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76. However, this was a policy choice; nothing in
theory barred dual jurisdiction over criminal offenses that were, in fact, dual jurisdictional
in character. See Warren, supra note 1, at 545-46.
166. For example, the theft provision found in § 16 of the April 30, 1790 Crime Bill
expressly applied to theft committed wherever the subject property might be found. Act of
Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 16, 1 Stat. 113. Similarly, separate federal criminal offenses of acces-
sory before and after the fact were applicable wherever "on the land or at sea" the conduct
might occur. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 10-11, 1 Stat. 114.
The § 5 theft provision of the 1790 Crime Bill provides a fascinating example of 18th-
century sentencing philosophy, as well as an interesting sidelight on what might be called
the "ripple effect" of criminal legislation: federalizing a state crime in order to deter inter-
ference with some other federal provision. The 1790 Crime Bill provided that, as part of
the penalty for murders committed on federal property, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 3, 1
Stat. 113, post-execution dissection of the defendant's body could be ordered. Id. § 4. Pre-
sumably, dissection was thought to be an additionally powerful deterrent sanction because
of its moral repugnancy. But then, to support this penalty, Congress created a separate
offense, theft of an executed body, in order to prevent persons from "rescu[ing]" an exe-
cuted defendant's body with impunity. Id. § 5. This provision expressly applied wherever
the body had been "deposited," not just to such thefts committed on federal property. I&.
167. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 and Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 4,
5, 16 Stat. 141 (now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1969 & Supp. 1995)).
168. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (mail fraud, now codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1984 & Supp. 1995)).
169. White Slave Traffic Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (now codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1970 & Supp. 1995)).
170. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (Act to tax persons distributing
"opium or coca leaves [and] their derivatives").
171. Federal Bank Robbery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-235, 48 Stat. 783 (1934) (now codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1984 & Supp. 1995)).
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Many today undoubtedly believe that strong and obvious "federal in-
terests" support these federal crimes, and that may in fact be so. The
relevant point here is simply that each of these statutes reaches, for
the most part, conduct that could be prosecuted locally if federal juris-
diction did not exist. Federalization of crime is simply not a new
phenomenon.
Despite the continually expanding body of dual jurisdiction fed-
eral criminal laws, federalism concerns have consistently been raised
in opposition to new federal crimes from the time of Screws' 72
through the 1980s.173 Interestingly, however, such concerns are sel-
dom voiced today in the political criminal federalization debate. This
is certainly not because such concerns are no longer present or per-
ceived; instead it seems likely that a silence about federalism concerns
has recently arisen because these concerns are essentially political and
pull in directions counter to the political leanings of most participants
of the current federalization debate.
For example, many "liberals"' 74 today oppose the federalization
of crime largely because of the severity of federal criminal Sentencing
Guidelines enacted in 1986.175 Yet these opponents may be loath to
make states-rights federalism arguments reminiscent of anti-civil
rights and anti-New Deal arguments that were successfully battled de-
cades ago.176 At the same time, the customary advocates of a federal-
ist states-rights theory tend today to be conservative law-and-order
proponents of federalizing criminal statutes.177 They have little inter-
172. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
173. See eg., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,586 (1981) (noting argument that
application of federal RICO statute to present facts "will substantially alter the balance
between federal and state enforcement of criminal law").
174. Of course, the limitations of using stereotypical characterizations such as "liberal"
and "conservative" must be recognized. Yet the labels are useful, it would seem, in con-
veying certain broad points. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 152, at 1146 (using "liberal" and
"conservative" to discuss uses of models of "judicial federalism"); Field, supra note 154, at
117 n.169 (noting other counterintuitive "liberal" versus "conservative" positions).
175. In 1986 Congress enacted the first of increasingly severe "mandatory minimum"
sentencing schemes for drugs. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-2 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(1988)). In 1987 new federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated; the
Guidelines were viewed as generally increasing the average length of federal sentences.
See Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. Tnmms, Sept. 30, 1990, at B22.
See also supra note 67.
176. See e.g., the arguments in dissent in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138-61
(1945); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 105-08 (1941) (recounting the losing argu-
ments of appellee).
177. For example, conservative U.S. Senator Alphonse D'Amato of New York (R-NY)
is generally credited with one of the broadest federalization suggestions ever advanced, a
crime bill amendment that would federalize any violent crime committed with a firearm.
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est in raising federalism concerns that might be used to block federal-
izing criminal legislation they favor. The result is the surprising
silence regarding federalism concerns, at least in the political realms
where the federalization debate is being played out. 78
Yet, federalism concerns are far from inconsequential; in fact,
they may have the strongest claim to legitimacy in the debate. De-
spite the fact that the First Congress "federalized" some dual jurisdic-
tion crimes, it seems clear that the vision of the Framers did not
include federal criminal courts of general jurisdiction. 179 And while
"local" crimes increasingly have been federalized during the past 200
years, the process has been halting and controversial. 180 Without fur-
ther detailing the substantial work that has been done in this area, it is
safe to assert that the constitutional foundations of our government
generally contemplate a more restricted role for federal courts than
for state courts with regard to criminal cases.' 8' Thus the federalism
concerns that are present (if not currently voiced) in the federalization
debate cannot be ignored.
See Taking Back Our Streets Act of 1995, H.R. 3, 104 Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which is
based on § 1213 of S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The D'Amato Amendment is the
repeated rallying point of the federal judiciary's anti-federalization views. See, eg., Crime
Bill Moves Through House, THE THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts), Jan. 1995, at 1 (noting with favor that the D'Amato Amendment is not included in
the House Crime Bill).
178. Not directly involved on the political front and sharing common work place con-
cerns, the federal judiciary appears to be a unified and vocal exception despite any political
divergence. See 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 139-40 (Long Range Planning
Committee composed of appointees from both parties); Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Annual
Report, supra note 47, at 1 (presenting federalist-sounding arguments); United States v.
Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 LEXIS 3039 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995). Judge Schwarzer and Russell
Wheeler's recent compilation of the arguments "on federalization" also surveys concerns
similar to those discussed here. ON FEDERALIZATION, supra note 5, at 10-17. Yet, perhaps
recognizing the sensitivity of such arguments in other contexts, that discussion never uses
the term "federalism," nor does it advert to the political use of such arguments in past
unrelated debates.
179. See Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JusTicE 775-76 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) [hereinafter Beale, Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction]; THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 153. See also United States v. Dewitt, 76
U.S. 41, 44-45 (1869) (Congress has no general "police regulation" powers).
180. Professor Beale views the history of federalization as somewhat more halting than
does this Article. Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 179, at 776. This may or
may not be more a descriptive disagreement than a substantive one.
181. Whether, or how much, this original contemplation ought to influence current
affairs is a matter of debate which this Article need not settle. See supra note 152. For if
federalism concerns are due no weight, then even broader federalization of crime than
suggested here might be appropriate. For now, this Article gives some, but not over-
whelming, weight to originalist federalist concerns.
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It seems fair to say that mainstream federalism concerns support
some presumption against federalizing criminal conduct that is al-
ready prosecutable by the states.18 In fact, in a very different context,
the Supreme Court has previously recognized something similiar to a
federalism presumption against certain congressional legislation.183
Under such an analysis, some good cause (defined by whatever feder-
alization principles are chosen), as well as textual authority in the
Constitution, should be demonstrated before the federal government
criminalizes matters of local concern.184
One final federalization myth should be addressed here: despite
rhetoric to the contrary, federalization need not be forever. Some
federalization critiques argue that making more and more crimes fed-
eral continually skews the federal-state balance in one direction and
irreparably rends the fabric of our federalism.185 This concern is
countered to some extent by the theory that because Congress is com-
posed of officials elected at state and local levels, any congressional
decision to federalize is, in some sense, made by the States' represent-
atives who will protect the States' interests.186
A more immediate counterpoint, however, is simply to note that
federalization need not be, and has not always been, forever. This is
true both by reference to prior historical episodes of controversial fed-
eralization efforts and by noting the possibility of using legislative
"sunset" provisions in federal criminal laws.
182. At the conclusion of their pamphlet, Schwarzer and Wheeler somewhat abruptly
assert a similar set of "working presumptions," although their source, and some develop-
ment of the meaning and application of their presumptions, is not offered. ON FEDERAL.-
ZATON, supra note 5, at 47.
183. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), held that in order not to tread unneces-
sarily on the states' inherent authority to regulate their own judiciaries, a presumption
against finding that Congress intended to so intrude when it enacted the Age Discrimina-
tion Act should operate, rebuttable only with very clear intentional language. Id. at 469-
70. See Rubin & Feely, supra note 152, at 904 (describing Gregory's holding as "principles
of federalism created a presumption against" legislation).
184. See infra text accompanying notes 236-247.
185. Thus, in United States v. Ilbrkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981), the Court noted that
"it is urged that [a broad] interpretation of RICO ... will substantially alter the balance
between federal and state enforcement of criminal law." Accord ON FEDERALIZATION,
supra note 5, at 18,19-21 (describing similar arguments). The Court's response in Turkette,
of course, was simply to acknowledge that even if this objection were accurate, "Congress
was well aware that it was entering a new domain of federal involvement" when it enacted
RICO and nothing constitutionally constrained it from so acting. 452 U.S. at 586.
186. See Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-vis the States: The Dis-
pensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552,1560-63 (1977); Herbert P. Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rv. 543, 546 (1954).
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The most obvious case of temporary federalization is Prohibition.
For over a decade, the federal government was involved in criminally
enforcing a constitutional ban on intoxicating liquors. 187 This plunged
the federal courts into the most dramatic criminal caseload crisis in
history.188 Eventually, however, the failure of this effort was generally
recognized, and federal Prohibition was repealed in 1933.189 As the
American Law Institute concluded in 1934, because of the removal of
Prohibition cases, the federal courts "should experience no further
difficulty in promptly dispatching their business .... 190
A different sort of temporary federalization can occur not by re-
peal, but by policies of nonprosecution. Such de facto defederaliza-
tion has occurred, for example, with regard to the Dyer Act, which
federalized the crime of auto theft in 1919.191 Enacted expressly to
"crush" interstate auto thefts, 9 2 the Dyer Act resulted in an average
of 1,466 federal prosecutions per year from 1922 to 1933.193 This stat-
ute has not been repealed, 194 and interstate auto theft has not been
"crushed." Yet, by 1991, the number of federal auto theft prosecu-
tions had dropped to 205 or less, or little more than two cases per year
187. Enacted in 1919 (effective in 1920), the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion provided that "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within... The United States... is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, re-
pealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Congress immediately enacted the Volstead Act (Na-
tional Prohibition Act) criminalizing conduct in violation of the Eighteenth Amendment
over President Wilson's veto. See Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919); HERBERT As-
BURY, THE GREAT ILLUSION: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF PROHIBITION (1950). In 1933 the
TWenty-First Amendment was ratified, repealing the Eighteenth Amendment and ending
large-scale federalization of prohibition crimes, leaving liquor enforcement to the states.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
188. See Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 179, at 778; supra text accom-
panying notes 51-54.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
190. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, PART I: CIUMI-
NAL CASES 3 (1934).
191. Pub. L. No. 66-70, 41 Stat. 324, 325 (1919). Sponsored by Senator Dyer, "The
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act" made it a federal crime to "transport[ ] in inter-
state ... commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen." While this
technically refers to an interstate transportation crime rather than purely auto theft, this
statute historically was used to prosecute simple auto thefts in which no particularly strong
or unique federal interest appeared. See, e.g., United States v. Maze, 468 F.2d 529, 536-38
(7th Cir. 1972) (analyzing 11 other federal appellate decisions), affd on other grounds, 414
U.S. 395 (1974).
192. H.R. REP. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
193. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 500-01. This figure may also include thefts from inter-
state carriers under the 1913 Carlin Act. Id. at 500 n.15. Even if this is so, however, the
result today has been de facto defederalization, as federal Carlin Act prosecutions are also
rare.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970 & Supp. 1995).
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per federal district.195 In fact, auto theft is simply not federally prose-
cuted, absent either multiple thefts (i.e., a "ring") or some accompany-
ing criminal conduct that is thought to warrant federal attention.196
Thus, by general agreement and exercise of federal prosecutorial dis-
cretion, federalized auto theft is virtually no burden at all on the fed-
eral courts-it has been de facto repealed. 97
Finally, in addition to the possibility of the repeal of federalized
crimes (de jure and de facto), Congress has authority to attach a "sun-
set" provision to criminal statutes thought to be particularly contro-
versial. Such a provision might state that the statute will expire (and
thus the conduct would no longer be a federal offense) after some
experimental period (say five years), unless Congress acts.198 This is a
familiar concept civilly.199 There is no reason in theory that such pro-
visions could not be used to address the specter of "permanent" feder-
alization. In fact, Congress specifically provided for the "sunset" of
one of the new firearms offenses in the 1994 Crime Bill.2 00
195. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics 50
(1991).
196. See UNITED STATES ATroRNEYs MANUAL 9-61.112 (directing that "individual
thefts" of autos not be prosecuted absent "exceptional circumstances"). This is also based
on the author's personal familiarity with unpublished federal prosecution guidelines for the
U.S. Attorney's Office in the Northern District of California, and a conversation with Eb
Luckel, Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of that office. Interview with Eb Luckel,
Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division, Office of the United States Attorney, Northern
District of California (Mar. 17, 1995) (auto thefts "are not prosecuted on a single-auto
basis"; "we haven't had a case like that in my memory") (notes on file with the Hastings
Law Journal).
197. Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (explaining con-
cept of "amending" the Constitution nonformally, by practice). This is not to say that
federal auto theft prosecutions might not be revived again, were some appropriate princi-
ple for such revitalization to manifest itself. Indeed, the possibility of such instant refeder-
alization is, some might say, a benefit of nonprosecution defederalization over legislative
repeal. The present point, however, is that federalization of auto theft in an earlier time
has not, in fact, irreparably shifted the state/federal prosecution balance. See also supra
note 31 (regarding nonprosecution of such federal crimes as 4-H club impersonation, etc.).
198. See generally Bruce Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for-Accountable Government, 28
ADmiN. L. REv. 511 (1976) (arguing that sunset provisions would create "an incentive for
periodic and comprehensive.., evaluation" of government programs and agencies); Dan
R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 401 (1978) (discussing
the Sunset Movement).
199. A computer-aided search of the United States Code for the phrase "sunset provi-
sion" in the LEXIS, Codes Library, Allcodes file, yields more than 100 federal statutes
containing some sort of sunset provision. See; eg., 5 U.S.C. § 571 (Supp. 1995) (referenc-
ing Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2738); 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(5) (1994).
200. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IX, § 110105(2), 108 Stat. 2000 (Sept. 13, 1994) (ten-
year sunset for sections 922(v), (w), and Appendix A of Title 18).
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However, sunset provisions can also create serious and complex
problems.20 1 At the very least, much judicial and legislative energy
and resources would be spent keeping track of various deadlines, re-
enactment, and debates about what conduct falls within or outside of
periods of illegality. Moreover, using sunset provisions instead of sub-
stantively determining what principles ought to govern federalization
simply substitutes a politically expedient gimmick for serious analysis.
On balance, this Article does not advocate sunset provisions for crimi-
nal laws, but merely notes that they can provide an alternative to en-
tirely foreclosing federal criminal jurisdiction over new, controversial
federal crimes.
I. Principles of Federalization
Normative, consequential preferences support federalization lim-
ited by a set of principles. Whether or not federal judges are over-
worked, a lower caseload does provide more time for reflection in
criminal as well as civil cases. Opportunity for care ought to be valued
in any court system and ought not be unnecessarily constrained. Simi-
larly, having a relatively low number of life-tenured federal judges
may be intrinsically valuable. 202 Finally, if it is true that the states'
criminal justice systems are so overburdened that they fail to deliver a
high quality of justice, then we ought not unnecessarily move in the
direction of federal equalization. Caseload equality between the state
and federal systems, simply for equality's sake, is unprincipled and
shortsighted.
For these reasons, a presumption against federalization is appro-
priate, to preserve some advantage for these intangible yet valuable
factors.
201. For example, early 1994 saw controversy surrounding the sunset lapse, and then
reenactment, of the federal Independent Prosecutor Act. See James Risen, Appellate
Court Asked to Review Starr Appointment, L.A. TIm s, Aug. 13, 1994, at A23. See also
Mark B. Blickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 209 (1986);
Lewis A. Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability in Sunset Legislation: An
Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMiN. L. REv. 393 (1981).
202. Compare Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 53 (proposing that Congress double the size
of the courts of appeals) with Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective
Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993) (arguing that more than 1,000 federal judges,
trial and appellate combined, would negatively affect the quality of federal justice). As
Professor Resnik has pointed out, however, once the hundreds of non-Article III judges
already acting in the federal system are counted, the 1,000 judge limit has already been
exceeded. Resnik, supra note 57.
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A. A Presumption Against Federalization
Any decision to legislate into federal law a crime already
prosecutable by the states ought to be guided by some set of princi-
ples; it should not be ad hoc or unthinkingly reactive. A starting point
ought to be a rebuttable presumption against federalization: even if
criminal federalization is not crushing our federal courts, traditional
federalism principles (as well as other concerns) suggest that an initial
presumption ought to run against federalizing criminal conduct over
which there already exists state criminal jurisdiction.20 3
However, any such presumption must be rebuttable because all
participants in this debate appear to agree that federalization of crime
is appropriate or necessary in some circumstances. 204 Thus, the search
for principles is an inquiry as to what guidelines are appropriate and
useful in deciding when the presumption against federalization should
be overcome and new federal crimes enacted.
B. The Problem with Principles
A principled jurisprudence of federalization is thus the goal.20 5
However, guidelines that are comprehensible, relatively specific, and
have some modicum of apolitical acceptance are necessary if the prin-
203. Accord ON FEDERALIZATION, supra note 5, at 47. See supra text accompanying
notes 182-184.
204. E.g., 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 19-22; ON FEDERALIZATION,
supra note 5, at 47. Thus, the 1994 Long Range Plan, which is generally opposed to feder-
alization, states that "[n]o one seriously disputes that conduct directly injurious to or affect-
ing the federal government or its agents" should be federalized. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 4, at 21. The Plan also asserts that "federal criminal jurisdiction should also
reach ... environmental concerns, nuclear regulation, and ... migratory birds," because
these are "interests unquestionably associated with a national government" or are its "in-
herent interests." Id. Finally, the Plan recommends continued federalization of crimes
with "sophisticated" or "substantial multistate ... aspects," "serious ... local government
corruption," and "criminal cases involving highly sensitive local issues." Id.
205. This Article suggests that appropriate principles governing federalization ought to
be applicable without regard to the substantive content of the criminal conduct at issue. In
an earlier age, this goal might have been described as a search for "neutral principles." See
Herbert P. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959). A more recent conception might be that of "transubstantive" procedural rules as
developed by the late Professor Robert M. Cover. See Robert M. Cover, For James Wra.
Moore, 84 YAL.E L.J. 718,721-22 (1975). Again, this Article purports only to acknowledge,
rather than to solve or choose a side in, the "trans-substantivity tangle." See Richard L.
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 761, 776-79 (1993); cf. supra note 152.
April 1995] MYTHS AND PRINCIPLES
ciples are actually to influence policymakers who have the power to
act in this area.20 6
Also, such principles are necessary only for dual jurisdiction crim-
inal conduct. When criminal conduct adversely affects federal inter-
ests where a state does not have criminal jurisdiction (e.g., on military
reservations, overseas, or on the high seas), then federalization of that
criminal conduct may be appropriate even if it would not be were ju-
risdiction dual.20 7 This is because no (or at least not as strong an) anti-
federalization presumption operates with regard to exclusive jurisdic-
tion criminal conduct. The present question, then, is what principles
should govern federalization of dual jurisdiction criminal conduct,
which presumptively should remain with the states.
Part of the difficulty in the federalization debate is that there al-
ready exists a large body of federal criminal law,2 0 8 much of which
federalizes dual jurisdiction conduct. Many of these existing federal
crimes have their champions who propose principles that will "cap-
ture" their favorites while limiting federalization overall. For exam-
ple, the Long Range Plan asserts that "[n]o one seriously disputes"
that crimes committed "against the federal government itself or its
agents" should be federalized.20 9
But why should this not be disputed? Why ought the federaliza-
tion debate not return to first principles and consider the substantive
content of federal law as a tabula rasa, so to speak? For example,
murder is an oft and competently prosecuted state crime.210 Why
should any murder of the thousands of persons encompassed by 18
U.S.C. section 1114 be federally prosecuted?211 Or murder of the
206. That is, Congress and the executive branch are the actors who propose, enact,
veto or sign, and execute new federal criminal laws. Federalization principles that have
been agreed upon only by judges and academics lack practical value unless accepted and
understood by legislators, executive branch policymakers, and prosecutors.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22 (discussing category of truly "exclusive"
federal jurisdiction).
208. See generally NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
(2d ed. 1993).
209. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21; see also supra note 204 (noting other
descriptions of assertedly appropriate, existing federalization in the Long Range Plan).
210. That is, competently prosecuted in general; specific case failures may well give
pause. E.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). But to the extent that we believe
murder should be federalized because states fail to adequately protect federal interests, the
principle being applied is one of state failure. See infra text accompanying notes 236-247
(proposing just such a principle).
211. Section 1114 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides for federal prosecu-
tion for murders or attempted murders of "any officer or employee ... or person assisting"
or "any civilian . . . employee" of over 30 federal agencies. (1984 & Supp. 1995). No
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President, for that matter?212 Similarly, the Long Range Plan asserts
that any crime related to a "regulatory field" which Congress has al-
ready preempted "should" be federalized.213 But why? Surely we can
formulate principles more principled than "everything already feder-
alized [except guns and drugs] should remain so.'214
Part of the problem with federalization, then, is that we like it in
discrete instances. Thus, the Long Range Planning Committee trum-
pets federalization of civil rights offenses.215 Similarly, when the 1994
Crime Bill federalized some domestic violence cases in the Violence
Against Women Act, critics of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction
generally found reason to support that specific legislation.21 6 But
"special interests" as a standard provides no principled guidance, any
more than does "existing federalized crimes" or "crimes we hate."
How can we separate the "good" federal crimes from the "bad"?
Even ardent opponents of federalization assert that certain crimi-
nal conduct, while certainly dual jurisdictional, is so offensive to im-
portant federal interests that it must be federalized.21 7 Assassinating
the President is one clear (and neutral) example; counterfeiting fed-
principle of federalization is apparent here; victims need not necessarily have been acting
in pursuit of their federal duties at the time of the assault, and other federal agencies are
not listed. The list of protected federal agents appears to have been created ad hoc over
time. See Legislative History note following 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1992) (showing dozens of
amendments since 1951).
212. Indeed, while murder of the federal officials listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1114 has been a
federal crime for decades, murder of the President was riot made a federal crime until 1965
after President Kennedy was assassinated. See Pub. L. No. 89-141, § 1, 79 Stat. 580 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988)).
213. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21.
214. As another example, while arguments for federalizing crimes related to "wildlife
preservation" (migratory birds, etc.) may be very strong (likely on a "state failure" theory),
they are not even advanced in the Long Range Plan's assertion that they "should" be
federalized simply because such crimes already have been. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 4, at 21. If the debate were returned to first principles, reasonable minds likely
could differ regarding the relative priorities of federal narcotics versus migratory bird
criminalization.
215. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 5,21-22. So too, it must be noted, does
the author of this Article.
216. See Eleanor H. Norton, Federalizing Feminism, THm RECORDER (S.F.), Aug. 11,
1994, at 8. Again, a version of a "state failure" theory was advanced by Representative
Norton. Id. (asserting "inadequacy--even collapse--of local law to protect women"). See
18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (Supp. 1995) (codifying criminal provisions of the Act).
217. This seems to be the tenor of the Long Range Plan's primary recommendation on
this point. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20-21 (Recommendation 1 in the
Nov. 1994, Recommendation 2 in the Mar. 1995). This recommendation, however, in fact
combines several discrete conceptions, including "conduct injurious to or affecting the fed-
eral government"; exclusively federal crimes ("treason"); and "regulatory field[s]" that
Congress "has taken over or preempted." Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 204.
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eral currency may be another. The civil rights offenses (protecting the
exercise of federal constitutional rights) are other often-pointed-to ex-
amples.218 Yet while civil rights offenses are important, their federali-
zation seems based not merely on importance, but on some additional,
unarticulated principle different from that which supports federalizing
the assassination of the President.
A principle of federalization that merely enshrines "important"
federal interests or some similar concept 219 provides no useful gui-
dance; instead it resonates of "we know it when we see it" (a standard
that proved unsatisfying in its original context 220). A principle that
proposes to federalize only when there is a "strong" (as opposed to
unique) federal interest at stake is not helpful because of its semantic
manipulability. Not only is "federal interest" an empty vessel whose
substantive content is far from universally agreed upon, but any inten-
sifier-strong, important, direct-simply adds to the potential manip-
ulability. Thus, one person's concept of a "strong federal interest"
might well be another person's idea of a "trivial local crime."'221
Take the federal civil rights offenses. The idea that there is a
strong federal interest in prosecuting assaults motivated by racial ani-
mus is well-accepted today.222 Because we are protecting the free ex-
ercise of federal constitutional rights, the federal courts are obviously
218. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245 (1988); see 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at
21-22.
219. The Long Range Plan, at different points, refers to "inherent [federal] interests"
and "interests unquestionably associated with a national government." 1994 LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 4, at 20-21. "Unquestionably" is a strong, undefined, and debatable
term. For example, listing the protection of migratory birds among the interests encom-
passed by this principle is surely at least "questionable" when scarce federal judicial re-
sources are at issue. Id. at 21. See also ON FEDERALIZATION, supra note 5, at 47.
220. See Jacobellis v. United States, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the ad
hoc, five-votes Redrup procedure for evaluating obscenity cases at the Supreme Court).
Justice Stewart's pithy and even pleasing assertion never garnered more than his own vote
in the obscenity context.
221. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between
State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the Martian Chronicles, 78 VA. L. Rav.
1769, 1831 (1992) (colorfully making a similar point by noting that "one person's Martian
may be another person's Venusian").
222. This view, so easily accepted today, was hotly contested when the conduct was
first federalized in 1866 and remained so even into the 1950s. See generally United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 806 (1966) (noting different view of federal/state division of author-
ity in the 1950s); Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea
of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2113, 2131 (1993) ("The federalism prob-
lem ... preoccupied the congressional debates over the 1866 ... Act.").
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the appropriate forum.'-m Yet if it is universally agreed today that
there is a strong federal interest in prosecuting assaults motivated by
racial animus,224 cannot a similar argument be applied to narcotics
and firearms offenses?
The argument goes something like this: Many governmental offi-
cials currently believe that narcotics ruin tens of thousands of lives
each year; indeed, the societal costs are staggering. Similarly, govern-
mental officials at every level apparently believe that firearms vio-
lence in our communities represents a national crisis.225 Moreover,
vital federal constitutional interests are at stake, starting with the
rights enshrined in our Constitution's Preamble: "to insure domestic
Tranquility" and "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."' ' 6 To respond, Congress must federalize these offenses
and vigorously pursue federal prosecutions, at least until the national
crisis subsides. The powerful engine of federal law enforcement is
needed no less than when "local" civil rights crimes threatened our
national social fabric.
This argument may not convince you. But if principles of federal-
ization are to provide useful guidance for legislators and the executive
branch, then the audience that must be convinced is not judges or
legal scholars, but others more (or at least no less) prone to take ad-
vantage of rhetorical manipulability. Unless we are to surrender the
federalization debate entirely to rhetoric, more specific guiding princi-
ples are required.
Another possible set of limiting federalization mechanisms might
focus purely on workload objections to federalization and borrow
from jurisdictional minimum concepts applied in federal civil stat-
223. This was, of course, not obvious to Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, or Jackson,
whose joint dissent in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), characterized the "bru-
tal" murder of the black victim by white sheriff's deputies as a "patently local crime." Id
at 139.
224. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 146; 1994 LONG RANGE PL" , supra note 4, at 5,
21-22 (endorsing federalization of civil rights offenses).
225. See, e.g., 140 CONG. Rc. S13,121 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) ("violence in our communities... is simply out of hand," citing reports on guns
in schools).
226. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
April 1995] • 1075
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
utes.227 Indeed, a few scattered federal criminal provisions already
embody such quantifiable jurisdictional devices. 22
Thus, if some substantive distaste for "minor" drug and gun
crimes in fact underlies the federal judiciary's current federalization
concerns,229 21 U.S.C. section 841(a) could be amended to federalize
only those narcotics offenses involving a significantly large amount or
high street value of controlled substances. That is precisely how the
penalty structure for federal narcotics offenses currently works: the
penalties become more severe as the quantity of controlled substance
involved increases. 230 Gun crimes could also be similarly limited: fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction might be extended only to offenses involving
three or more guns, particularly lethal weapons, or shootings resulting
in injury or death.23'
But while such mechanisms could immediately address workload
concerns,2 32 they are also unprincipled in the sense of that term ap-
plied here. The only principle operating in such a structure is a pro-
tectionist one-to protect federal courts from hearing many presently
federalized gun and drug cases-but without a principled distinction
227. I thank my colleague Richard Marcus for suggesting the consideration of such
mechanisms from the civil side. For example, civil cases based on diversity of citizenship
cannot be filed in federal court unless "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $50,000." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1993). Similarly, until 1980, the civil "federal question"
statute provided federal jurisdiction only when the amount in controversy exceeded
$10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1978) (repealed 1980).
228. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1995) (limiting federal prosecution to cases involving
"criminally derived property.., of a value greater than $10,000").
229. See supra text accompanying notes 64-79 and 140-48.
230. The primary federal narcotics statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988), simply criminal-
izes possession with intent to distribute "a" controlled substance, no matter what the
amount. Subsection (b) then sets out a lengthy penalty hierarchy tied to the quantity of
drugs at issue. For example, if the offense involves less than 500 grams "of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine," the penalty is from 0 to 20 years; if
between 500 grams and 5 kilograms, then the penalty is 5 to 40 years; and if 5 kilograms or
more, then 10 years to life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988). If limiting the federal criminal
caseload is the goal, such quantity concepts could simply be moved into section 841(a).
231. Current federal weapons offenses require merely that the firearm be "use[d] or
carrie[d]" (18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976 & Supp. 1995)) or "receive[d] or possesse[d]" (26
U.S.C. § 5861 (1989)).
232. Another idea from the civil side that has at least some initial theoretical attraction
is some conception of abstention, see, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), although that doctrine as civilly applied has
been criticized and hardly seems transferrable to the criminal context. See generally Mar-
tin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94
YALE L.J. 71 (1984); but see Rosemary Herbert, Abstention as a Solution to Successive State
and Federal Prosecutions (Spring 1985) (unpublished student manuscript, on file with
author).
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from "minor" civil rights assaults, bank robberies, or false statements
on federal forms.233 If narcotics and weapons crimes truly are nation-
ally widespread in crisis proportions, refusing to address them with
federal resources simply for workload reasons arguably violates the
notion of a responsive federal government. Nor is simply throwing
federal money at the problem, while closing the federal courthouse
doors, a principled response if state courts are already handling five
times as many criminal cases per judge.23 4
The federalization debate ought to turn on an axis more princi-
pled than workload: indeed, all sides seem to recognize that regard-
less of workload, it is sometimes proper for federal court resources to
concentrate on national criminal problems (such as civil rights or even
narcotics on occasion2 35). The challenge is to capture linguistically a
comprehensible description of criminal conduct that is appropriately
federal, rather than to simply roll up the federal courthouse draw-
bridges on a workload rationale.
C. A Principle of Demonstrated State Failure
It may be that no language can capture the principles we want to
apply, without being so generalized as to be useless as a practical mat-
ter. And, of course, no principles will work if subject to unprincipled
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. 1995) (permitting federal prosecution for any
false statement made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States"). Consistent with this broad language, this statute has been held to
encompass even false statements made to state agencies, if they ultimately might come
"within the jurisdiction" of some federal agency. E.g., United States v. Facchini, 832 F.2d
1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1987).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63 (discussing state courts' criminal
caseload); accord Hon. J. Anthony Kline, Commen" The Politicalization of Crime, in this
Symposium Issue. Without addressing this imbalance, the Long Range Plan recommends
"an increase in federal resources allocated to state criminal justice systems" and indeed
goes so far as to suggest that Congress "encourag[e] prosecution of federal crimes in state
courts." 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 22-23. But, as Chief Judge Kaye notes,
swamped state courts are likely to be hostile to such proposals. Kaye, supra note 5.
235. Thus, the Long Range Plan provides that "a massive enterprise, such as a multi-
state drug operation," or even a "sophisticated enterprise" within a "single state," would
be appropriate federal criminal cases. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21. The
example given for the latter category, however, is "white collar crime," id., rather than
sophisticated urban gangs that are presently often prosecuted in federal courts.
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application.236 Yet even a preliminary set of guidelines is better than
the current ad hoc approach.237
"Unique" federal interests is too limited; "intrastate commerce"
is too broad; and "strong" federal interests is too manipulable. There
is, however, a principle that both explains many past federalizations
that we currently accept and might realistically work to limit future
federalization: demonstrated state failure. This principle would en-
dorse the federalization of criminal conduct only when there is a
demonstrated failure of state and local authorities to deal with the
targeted conduct.238
A concept of demonstrated state failure as a guide to principled
federalization immediately raises questions. What counts as failure?
Who may, or must, demonstrate the failure? What sort of demonstra-
tion is required? Is there judicial review and, if so, of what scrutiny?
Such important questions cannot be exhaustively addressed here; only
a brief sketch is provided and further development will be necessary.
A principle of demonstrated state failure requires a comparison
of state and local versus federal realities (workload, resources, investi-
gative differences, etc.), rather than an absolute assertion that any
particular criminal conduct is "appropriately" or "not appropriately"
federal.239 "Failure" is intended to be nonpejorative; it encompasses a
simple resource-driven inability to address criminal conduct, as well as
236. That is, perhaps no principles can prevent federal congresspersons (who lack any
other immediate forum in which to demonstrate their will-they cannot directly file state
legislation) from making carjacking a federal crime in response to a few highly publicized
cases. See supra note 16. If so, this Article suggests a second-level "check" on the possibil-
ity by demanding that federal prosecutors also apply federalization principles before exer-
cising any dual jurisdiction they are given by Congress. See infra text accompanying notes
248-254.
237. Thus, despite the academic critique in this Article, the efforts of the Long Range
Planning Committee, Judge Schwarzer, and Russell Wheeler to state guiding principles are
extremely valuable.
238. Such a concept is far from new; to the contrary, it states a theme that is consist-
ently invoked when a federal response to criminal conduct already prosecutable by the
states is demanded. See, e.g., Curbing Violence at Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TiNMEs, Jan. 4,
1995 (editorial following abortion clinic violence, proclaiming that "where local law en-
forcement fails, the Federal Government must intervene"). Thus, a demonstrated state
failure principle can be said to underlie (to list only a few examples) the post-Civil War
civil rights offenses, federalization of bank robbery in the 1930s when interstate transporta-
tion by car was becoming fast and common, and the 1994 Violence Against Women Act.
This Article's contribution is simply to suggest that this underlying theme be explicitly
endorsed as a general and limiting federalization principle.
239. Cf. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that "[i]n principle, crim-
inal activity should be prosecuted in a federal court only in those instances in which state
court prosecution is not appropriate").
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intentional refusals to act. Such "failure" might be demonstrated by
federal authorities when federal intervention is deemed necessary
even over state objection (as in the civil rights prosecutions of the
1960s). Conversely, "failure" could be asserted by state and local au-
thorities in need of aid for federal assistance (as appears to be hap-
pening today in some areas with regard to narcotics and firearms
offenses).
Thus, state failures in this arena may be of two kinds: those rec-
ognized by the states and those disputed by the states. The federal
courts have an appropriate role to play in both situations. First, when
local authorities can demonstrate that their resources are inadequate
to address a serious criminal problem, it is unseemly and even "anti-
federalist" for the federal government to turn a blind eye. We may
not like gun and drug crimes, but at least in some urban areas today it
may be federal resources, the federal forum, and incapacitating fed-
eral penalties that stand between a plausible attempt to address these
behaviors and total governmental abdication.24°
Second, when state or local authorities refuse to address criminal
conduct on some systemic level, the call for federal intervention may
be even more appropriate.241 Civil rights offenses in the South in the
1950s provide the most compelling example. Another example can be
found in instances of state and local governmental corruption, in
which the criminal conduct at issue may place it beyond the effective
reach (or interest) of state authorities. 242
240. This is particularly true today because federal penalties for many crimes are signif-
icantly more severe than their state equivalents; this is a dramatic flip-flop from 20 years
ago. The deterrent effect (specific incapacitation and perceived general deterrence) of se-
vere federal sentences is, without doubt, the reason local authorities have turned to federal
prosecutors with gun and drug cases in recent years. See Scott Wallace, The Drive to Feder-
alize Is a Road to Ruin, 8 CRim. JusT. 8 (1993) (noting "the increasing federal/state punish-
ment gap ... drawing cases into the federal system," although disputing any deterrent
value).
241. Such an intentional failure should be systemic rather than isolated; a single in-
stance of failed or ignored prosecution ought not suffice to generate new federal legislation
(although once legislated, the statute might appropriately be invoked even in single, egre-
gious cases like the failed state Rodney King prosecution). Nor should federalization be
inevitable on this rationale; a state refusal to address conduct which is criminalized in that
state but upon which there is no general agreement (assisted suicide, for example) might
well not warrant any federal legislative response.
242. See 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21 (endorsing federalization of
"widespread state or local government corruption"). However, a demonstrated state fail-
ure should be required even in this context; local prosecutors have not always been ineffec-
tive in addressing local governmental corruption, and federal prosecution of local
corruption for publicity purposes alone, without inquiry into state failure, would not meet
the federalization principle proposed here.
April1995] MYTHS AND PRINCIPLES 1079
An important component of this principle is the concept of dem-
onstration. A simple assertion of state failure, by either state or fed-
eral authorities, should not be sufficient to overcome the presumption
against federalization. Such a demonstration might include a showing
of the extent of the criminal conduct, the adverse effects it is having
on the public interest, and the amount of local resources and effort
devoted thus far. Examples of egregious conduct gone unprosecuted,
or unsatisfactorily prosecuted, might be provided; but it seems un-
likely that a single instance should suffice. The degree and types of
proof necessary for a sufficient demonstration are important questions
for further development. But Congress would have to be convinced,
rationally, that despite the state's efforts (good faith or otherwise) to
address the crimes at issue, the results have been inadequate to pro-
tect the public interest.
Thus, a requirement of demonstration might, or might not, sup-
port some modicum of judicial review. Were it to adopt such a princi-
ple, Congress might require that hearings be held or at least that
findings be stated and supported. In turn, this might be subject to
some "rational basis in the record" review.243
If honestly applied, a principle of demonstrated state failure
could place meaningful limits on future federalization efforts; it also
comports with the Long Range Plan's call for wholesale review of ex-
isting federalized dual jurisdiction crimes.244 It supports some form of
open-ended sunset provisions: when a state failure is cured, the prin-
cipled rationale for federalization disappears.245 Thus, instances of
243. See United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3039, at *14-15 (U.S.
Apr. 26, 1995) (endorsing rational basis review of commerce authority). Lopez reaffirms
that legislative findings are relevant to judicial review, albeit not dispositive. Id. at *24-25.
244. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 22. Of course, the Long Range Plan
does not invoke any state failure concept to support or describe such a review; rather, it
states simply that provisions "no longer serving an essential federal purpose" should be
repealed. That unexplicated concept, however, is bound to provoke disagreement in any
congressional review; a direction to repeal those existing federal crimes that the states
appear to be adequately addressing might result in less dispute and more repeal.
245. The March 1995 Draft Long Range Plan has added an endorsement of sunset
provisions. See supra note 39; 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN 25. This Article advocates at most
only "weak" sunset provisions for federal crimes, providing that federal criminal jurisdic-
tion will end only if Congress (or some other federal body) finds that the need has ended.
This differs from a "strong" sunset provision under which termination is automatic on
some date even if the need persists. Moreover, sunset repeals may be worse policy overall
than simply permitting de facto defederalization by prosecutorial discretion (see supra text
accompanying note 201), in areas where a future need for federal prosecutions can be
envisioned, because it is far harder to enact new legislation than to leave dormant legisla-
tion not currently needed. Again, however, pursuit of this tangent requires development
beyond the scope of the present Article.
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temporary federalization and de facto defederalization 246 fit squarely
within the proposed principle. Finally, a "demonstrated state failure"
principle may also support the sort of nonfederalization response em-
bodied in the 1994 Crime Bill, providing federal seed money to state
and local authorities to help address areas of failure without substan-
tive federalization.247
Much remains to be done on the concept of federalization princi-
ples. But a principle of demonstrated state failure addresses some
federalism concerns, articulates a rationale for many instances of past
criminal federalization, and might sensibly and nonsubstantively oper-
ate to limit federalization. Some principles that have been proposed
mask a protectionist "dignity" conception of the federal courts that is
unseemly; others are too vague to be of real assistance. A demon-
strated state failure principle surely has flaws and is far from self-de-
fining. But perhaps it better describes a commonality of thought in
this area and should be pursued.
D. Application of Federalization Principles by the Executive Branch
Legislative principles of federalization cannot be the end of the
effort; federalization principles must reach the executive branch as
well. The decision whether to actually prosecute in federal court
under statutory authority once granted is made by federal prosecu-
tors, not congresspersons or the judiciary.24 8 Legislation may give the
power to prosecute federally, but the discretion whether to do so lies
with the Attorney General and her agents. The principle of "demon-
strated state failure"-or any other set of federalization principles
that may emerge-therefore ought to be extended to the executive's
decision to prosecute if it is to be fully effective.249
Thus, federal prosecutors should be required to find that applica-
ble federalization principles have been fulfilled before instituting fed-
eral prosecutions of dual jurisdiction crimes. Again, only a brief
sketch of this idea appears here. But such a requirement undoubtedly
could be imposed by direction from the Attorney General to her
246. See supra text accompanying notes 187-197 (describing these concepts).
247. See Beale, supra note 5.
248. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see United States v. Schwartz,
857 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In our system of government, it is the executive branch,
not the judicial branch, which holds the right to determine" how to proceed with a federal
prosecution); United States v. Huntley, 976 F.2d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing dis-
missal of narcotics prosecution described as "minor" by district court).
249. Accord 1994 LONG RANGE PLA, supra note 4, at 23.
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many Department of Justice prosecutors, the ninety-four U.S. Attor-
neys, and their hundreds of Assistant U.S. Attorneys.250
The need for mandated executive branch application of federali-
zation principles seems apparent. Even if Congress concludes that a
state failure to address some crime makes federalization legislation
appropriate, the state "failure" upon which Congress's decision is
predicated may well not exist in every district, nor may it persist over
time.251 In order to give teeth to a presumption against federalization,
federal prosecutors ought to be required to consider the local situa-
tion before choosing to exercise the jurisdictional authority they have
been given. The goal is to ensure a principled exercise of the congres-
sional decision to federalize; if a state failure principle is operating, it
must be part of that exercise.
However, an executive branch federalization review should not
be required before every indictment is filed; efficiency concerns as
well as respect for prosecutorial discretion counsel a somewhat more
generalized application. Thus, relatively broad temporal and geo-
graphic determinations (such as "for the next year, we will concen-
trate on bringing federal civil rights prosecutions in the following
states") should suffice. Nor would any right to judicial review of the
decision to prosecute for adherence to federalization principles be ap-
propriate. Judicial review of prosecutorial discretion has historically
been quite limited,252 and no participants in the current federalization
debate suggest a change in this doctrine. Nor should judicial review
250. The United States Attorneys Manual (USAM) is an internal Department of Justice
publication that collects such guidelines and requirements; the USAM is published in the
12-volume DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL (1994). The Attorney General frequently
directs federal prosecutors to make certain inquiries, meet certain standards, and obtain
centralized approvals before instituting particular prosecutions. For representative ap-
proval requirements, see, e.g., USAM § 9-47.110 (Foreign Corrupt Practice Act prosecu-
tions); § 9-75.001 (obscenity prosecutions); § 9-105.100 (money laundering prosecutions);
and § 9-110.101 (RICO). See generally 12 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra, at
1193-2 supp. (table of "prior approval requirements"). Indeed, the USAM already con-
tains "principles of federal prosecution" issued by the Attorney General, which include
guidance on how to determine whether a "substantial federal interest" exists in particular
prosecutions. USAM, supra, §§ 9-27, 9-27.230. USAM provisions are binding on federal
prosecutors, although they provide no "rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by
law by any party." USAM, supra, § 1-1.100.
251. Cf. 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20 (noting need for federal civil
rights prosecutions "in some parts of the country").
252. See supra note 248 (Wayte case).
[Vol. 46
be called for, if the Attorney General and her designees sincerely
commit to the federalization principles to be applied.25 3
Finally, once federalization principles acceptable to the executive
branch are formulated and adopted, the Attorney General should in-
stall some ongoing internal review of federal prosecution decisions in
order to ensure that prosecutors are adhering to the federalization
principles. Nor would individual decisions to prosecute be entirely
unreviewable; as is the case with RICO prosecutions or certiorari de-
cisions today, parties might seek internal Department of Justice re-
view with supervisory personnel, invoking federalization principles to
oppose prosecutive decisions.25
E. Brief Thoughts on Practice Proposals
Federal courts must continue to pursue efficiency strategies; their
overall workload is not likely to decrease significantly no matter what
criminal federalization principles are developed.2 55 For example,
United States District Judge Edward Rafeedie in Los Angeles has re-
cently written that many federal court trials are inefficiently adminis-
tered and consequently "[a]lmost all jury trials take from two to three
times longer than they should.1256 He offers a number of ideas on
how to improve this situation. In addition, districts that are experienc-
ing extreme criminal trial crunches should consider implementing
some form of "master calendar" assignment system.2 57
Although it is superficially appealing, the responsive mechanism
proposed long ago by Charles Warren of vesting concurrent jurisdic-
253. This is not a vain hope; in 1994 Attorney General Reno convened a "Three-
Branch Roundtable" to address the issues and divergent views surrounding federalization
of crime. See 'Ianscript of Proceedings, Overlapping and Separate Spheres: A Three-
Branch Roundtable on State and Federal Jurisdiction, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 7, 1994)
(on file with author). The Roundtable Working Groups have produced Reporters' drafts
addressing many of the issues discussed here, which are reprinted as part of this Sympo-
sium Issue.
254. Thus (based on the author's criminal practice experience both in and out of the
Department of Justice), it is not uncommon for Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
within the Criminal Division to meet with interested defense counsel prior to approving
sensitive federal prosecutions. Similarly, review of tentative certiorari decisions with the
Solicitor General are not uncommon. See REBACCA MAE SA.oAR, THm SoLICrroR GEN-
ERAL THE PoLrICs OF LAW 99 (1992) (noting that "individual citizens and interest groups
lobby the Solicitor General and his staff").
255. See 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that "various procedural
innovations have been adopted" by federal courts to respond to caseload increases).
256. Rafeedie, supra note 99, at 6.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 114-121 (discussing master calendar concept).
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tion over federal crimes in state criminal courts258 is entirely superflu-
ous and distracts from analysis. It should not be pursued. Such dual
prosecutive jurisdiction for federal crimes was actually granted by
Congress to the states in the early years of our nation; that fact some-
what undercuts traditional view that such delegation is unconstitu-
tional.2 59 Although the legislative response to Dean Warren's 1925
article was apparently nil, recent federalization concerns have
prompted a rediscovery of his suggestion.260 But putting aside consti-
tutional objections, this solution is unlikely to be welcomed by the
host state courts in light of their own huge current criminal
caseloads. 261 Moreover, to avoid constitutional objections, any such
state jurisdiction over federal crimes must be voluntary on the states'
parts and cannot be made mandatory.262 Yet state courts are already
hugely overworked, making new grants of discretionary criminal juris-
diction gratuitous.
Finally, and in any case, the criminal federalization debate by def-
inition addresses only "dual jurisdiction" crimes, over which conduct
the state courts already have criminal power. Thus, the Warren con-
cept is completely superfluous; if state courts wish to reach the con-
duct criminally, they have no need for jurisdiction over duplicative
federal statutes. In fact, federal prosecutors often request that local
law enforcement authorities pursue their criminal cases in state
court.263 Even if they have a choice of statutes (state or federal),
states are unlikely to assume more of this burden today than they al-
ready are shouldering. 264
258. See Warren, supra note 1.
259. Id. at 577-83. Despite the fact that Congress granted state courts authority to
prosecute federal crimes, in 1842 the Supreme Court stated its view that such delegation to
the state courts of federal prosecutive jurisdiction was unconstitutional. Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842).
260. See Beale, supra note 5; 1994 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 22.
261. See Kaye, supra note 5.
262. Warren unhesitatingly acknowledged this in his 1925 proposal. See Warren, supra
note 1, at 594, 597-98. Accord New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992)
(Congress "has the power to regulate individuals, not States").
263. If state authorities do prosecute in their own courts, federal prosecutors generally
decline any successive prosecution. See USAM, supra note 250, § 9-2.142 (stating this dec-
lination policy); Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960) (noting the policy).
264. In addition, it is primarily higher federal penalties that make federal prosecutions
attractive to state authorities; but cf. Jeffries and Gleeson, supra note 27 (federal proce-
dural advantages may also attract state cases). But serious state constitutional questions
would arise, it would seem, if state courts attempted to impose federal penalties that were
more severe than the penalties that a state's own legislature has approved for the same
conduct. Neither Warren nor the Long Range Plan discusses the penalty implications of
their federal-crimes-in-state-court proposals.
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Conclusion
Federal judicial resources are surely precious; we must be careful
not to dissipate them ad hoc. Yet it is the grandeur and authority of
the federal courts that ultimately may be the best rationale for assert-
ing federal criminal jurisdiction to address persistent criminal
problems. If the quality of justice is better in the federal courts,265
then problems of crime cannot be ignored federally while state crimi-
nal justice systems slowly sink and justice fails. Perhaps there are
even constitutional, federalism, or due process limits to the overload-
ing of state criminal courts that would constitutionally require federal
courts to step in when state justice fails.266
In any case, the "crisis" of federalization appears to be over-
stated. Rather than panic and close the federal courthouse doors
against new federal crimes categorically, we ought to exercise federal
authority in a principled manner, when states are demonstrably un-
able or unwilling to address criminal behavior that has reached some
significant proportions. One goal of the federal Constitution is "a
more perfect Union, '267 not a widening separation of the business of
state and federal courts. The gulf between state and federal courts
today in the criminal arena is apparent. On occasion, the people and
the states have a right to demand a principled exercise of federal crim-
inal authority, and may just as rightfully criticize unprincipled limita-
tions as unprincipled extensions.
265. See supra note 125 (noting debate regarding whether parity is or is not a myth).
266. Cf. Amar & Marcus, supra note 146 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires federal criminal jurisdiction over civil rights offenses).
267. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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